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When the Irish convention met in 1917. it set im a land purchase sub­
committee under the chairmanship of Lord Anthony McDonnell. Having examined 
the financial arrangements of previous legislation, as outlined in Chapter 
One. it came to the conclusion that these acts had failed, to complete lands 
purchase because the interest rates of the land stock used were set too Low. 
The committee then drew up a plan for the completion of land purchase, which 
involved three basic principles, described in Chapter Two. All tenanted 
holdings were to be automatica 1 ly vested, in the tenants, if thev did not 
require modification. All untenanted land in congested districts was to 
vest in the CDB, for the relief of congestion, and an automatic method of 
fixing the price of land, was included to expedite the process.
These proposals were included in the 1920 land bill which never became 
law. Meanwhile, agrarian unrest had become widespread, in the west after 
1918. Chapter Three explains how the Dai 1 was forced to intervene, and. hew 
the Land Bank and. the Land. Settlement Commission did some useful short term 
work . but thev had limited resources and had little long, term effectiveness.
Chapter Four details how the Free State government signed an agreement 
in February 1923, which settled the questions of liabilities for annuities, ■ 
excess stock and. bonus. It also included a promise bv the British to 
guarantee new Free State land stock- on condition tha.t thev approved the 
legislation. Patrick Hogan. Minister for Agriculture, realised the 
political danger and. told, a land lord-tenant conference that this credit was 
been given without anv conditions, so the agreement had to be kept a secret.
Chapter Five relates the process bv which the 1923 land, bill was 
formulated, by Hogan, It adopted the basic principles of the Irish 
convention's proposals, although the details were altered, considerably. The 
1923 bill was not as generous to the landlords, but it was more generous 
than some would, have wished. The 1923 land act, as it became, wa.s the act 
that completed land purchase, and. finally removed, the landlord from Ireland.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1868, there was great uncertainty in British 
political circles. The parliamentary reform act that had
been passed the previous year had greatly increased the size
of the electorate and had —alteredthe s h a p e o f many
constituencies, so that no one could predict how this new
electorate would vote. This reform act had been the product 
of an unusual alliance between the Conservatives, who were in 
a minority position in the house of commons, and the more
radical elements of the Liberal Party. Once reform had been 
passed, this alliance was unlikely to last very long, but 
Gladstone, as leader of the Liberals, could not afford to 
take that chance. He needed to find a truly 'liberal' issue 
that would crystallise the division between Liberals and
Conservatives, and bring the radicals back on side. The 
issue he picked on was the disestablishment of the Church of 
Ireland. Having first brought down the government on a 
parliamentary vote on the issue, he proceeded to turn 
disestablishment into his 'single issue' for the triumphant 
general election campaign of that year.
On election, Gladstone succeeded in having the Irish 
Church Act, 1869, passed by parliament. This act, which 
disestablished the Church of Ireland and severed all legal 
connections between church and state in Ireland, was rightly 
regarded as a landmark in the constitutional history of both
1
Britain and Ireland. Although disestablishment was the main 
principle of the act and disendowment of church property the 
part that most attracted public attention, there is another 
reason why this act is deserving of an honoured place in 
Irish history. In fact, it was an almost unintended 
byproduct of the act that was to have the most far-reaching 
effects for the future. The act stipulated that tenants of 
church lands were to be given the option of purchasing their 
holdings from the Church Temporalities Commission, which had 
taken control of those lands that were no longer used 
directly by the church. By 1880, over 6,600 tenants had 
taken advantage of this opportunity, paying a quarter of the 
price in cash immediately, and paying the rest of the 
purchase money at an annual rate of 4%.'*' While the details 
and the numbers availing of this offer may seem 
insignificant, the principle involved certainly ***does not. 
This was the principle of peasant proprietorship.
In 1870, Gladstone returned to his 'mission to pacify 
Ireland' and turned his attention to the problems arising 
from the Irish system of land tenure. Deasy's act of 1860 
had declared that the legal relationship between landlord and 
tenant went no deeper than that of parties to a contract of 
land use in return for rent. This classically free market 
doctrine left the tenant without any rights to his holding 
and made eviction a much simpler procedure for the landlord. 
In trying to redress the balance, Gladstone had to tread 
warily, as there were many landowners in Britain who feared 
that any radical alteration in Irish land law might
2
subsequently be transported across the Irish Sea. The Ulster 
custom, also known as tenant right or free sale, was to be 
given full legal standing in those areas where it was already 
in operation. Tenants evicted for reasons other than for 
non-payment of rent, were to be compensated for disturbance 
of occupancy while, all evicted tenants were to receive 
compensation for improvements that had been made on their 
holdings. This was a tacit admission that the tenant did 
indeed have a legal interest in his holding. As with the 
Irish church act, the provisions for land purchase were but a 
minor part of the act. The Bright clause allowed tenants to 
borrow two thirds of the price, which was to be repaid over 
35 years at 5%. While only 877 tenants purchased their land
under this act, the political acceptability of peasant
2proprietorship was being consolidated.
Drafting inadequacies and hostile interpretation by the 
courts meant that, in practical terms, the 1870 act was a 
failure. When the country was at the height of the land war
a decade later, Gladstone responded with, in addition to
coercion, a much bolder piece of legislation. The Land Law 
(Ireland) Act, 1881, gave full legal standing to the 'three 
fs1 over the entire country. The granting of free sale and 
fixity of tenure established the principle of dual ownership 
of land, while the fair rent provision protected the tenant 
from 'rack-renting'. This was achieved by the setting up of 
the Irish Land Commission and the Land Court to arbitrate 
between landlord and tenant. The act was amended the
following year, as a result of the Kilmainham treaty, to
3
include in its provisions those who were in arrears of rent, 
and was again amended in 1887 to include leaseholders. As 
regards land purchase, the Land Commission was to advance
three quarters of the price payable, at 5% over 35 years, but
3only 731 tenants purchased their holdings. That so few
sales were agreed between 1870 and 1885 reflects the
unattractive nature of the terms to both landlord and tenant.
The first serious attempt to aid and encourage tenant
ownership in Ireland was the Purchase of Land (Ireland) Act,
1885, or as it was better known, the Ashbourne act. For the
next 25 years the initiative in land purchase legislation was
to lie with Conservative governments and land purchase policy
would form an integral part of the policy of constructive
unionism, popularly known as 'killing home rule by kindness1.
Under the terms of the 1885 act the tenant could borrow the
4full price, to be repaid over 49 years at 4%. £5 million
was made available for the operations of the act and between
1885 and 1888, 25,400 tenants purchased their holdings, many
5of these in Ulster, totalling 952,600 acres. In 1888,
Arthur Balfour, the new Chief Secretary, provided a further 
£5 million for land purchase.
The 1891 land act, or Balfour's act, coming at the end 
of the plan of campaign, decreed that peasant proprietorship 
was to be the basis of land tenure in Ireland. This act also 
established the Congested Districts Board in the west of the 
country. A new system of financing land purchase was
introduced, with the landlord being paid in guaranteed land 
stock, equal in nominal amount to the price. £33 million was
4
made available but only £13.5 million of this was taken up, 
due in part to a number of restrictive clauses in the act, 
but also because the landlords were reluctant to sell for 
depreciated stock. From 1891-6, 47,000 holdings were bought 
out under the act.6 In 1896, this act was amended by Gerald 
Balfour, who removed many of those restrictive clauses and 
provided more money for land purchase. He also empowered the
7Land Court to sell 1,500 bankrupt estates to the tenants.
The definition of a congested district given in the 1891 
act was:
Where at the commencement of this Act more than 
20% of the population of a county, or in the case of 
the County Cork either riding thereof, live in 
electoral divisions of which the total rateable value, 
when divided by the number of the population gives a 
sum of less than £1-10-00 for each individual, those 
divisions shall, for the purposes of this Act, be 
separated from the county in which they are 
geographically situated and form a separate county, jn 
this Act referred to as a Congested Districts County.
This definition restricted the operations of the CDB to 
a few isolated areas in the western counties. In 1909, the 
congested districts were redefined to embrace the whole of 
Connaught as well as the counties of Donegal and Kerry with 
portions of Clare and Cork.
It was generally accepted at this time that there were 
two broad categories of holdings in the country: economic and 
uneconomic holdings. A very rough guide was that any holding 
with a rateable valuation of under £10 was regarded as 
uneconomic and, whilst these holdings were scattered 
throughout the country, they were most thickly concentrated 
in the area of the CDB. Congestion on an estate could 
typically involve 10 to 15 small uneconomic holdings,
5
possibly sub-divided into as many as 50 plots under the
rundale system, while a congest was a tenant on such an
estate or, as one commentator put it, a man trying to farm 
9without land.
The function of the CDB was to enable the tenants to 
break out of the poverty cycle that this system of land 
tenure trapped them into. It attempted this gargantuan task 
with such methods as the distribution of seed potatoes and 
oats, as well as with grants and low-interest loans for the 
development of forestry, livestock, poultry breeding and 
small domestic industries. It also spent a considerable 
amount of money on relief employment works such as road and 
harbour building. From 1903, it was authorised to purchase 
extra land from large estates to enlarge small holdings, and 
in 1909 it was given limited powers of compulsory purchase.
In all, the CDB redistributed 1,000 estates totalling 2
.,,. 10 million acres.
The next instalment of land purchase came with the land 
act of 1903. This, the Wyndham act, was based on the 
recommendations of the land conference of the previous year. 
Landlords got a 12% bonus from the government on the price 
agreed, if they sold their entire estate, including demesne 
lands. These would be sold to the Estates Commissioners, a 
new body which was set up within the Land Commission for the 
purposes of this act, and then repurchased. Any untenanted 
land which was purchased by the Estates Commissioners was 
used by them to relieve congestion; by improving, enlarging 
and rearranging the holdings on the estates before vesting
6
them in the tenant purchasers. The money for the advances 
was to be raised by the issue and sale of a guaranteed 2.75% 
land stock so that the landlords could be paid in cash. The
tenant's annuity was to be 3.2 5%, to be repaid over 68.5
11 • . . .  years. Many of the leading nationalist politicians of the
time, such as Michael Davitt and John Dillon, as well as the
Freeman's Journal, opposed this act, as they considered the
terms too favourable to the landlord. This opposition was
completely ignored by the tenants, as they expressed their
approval of the act in the only meaningful way possible. By
1908, £28 million had been advanced for land purchase and
already arrears of sales totalled approximately £56
., . . 12 million.
In 1907, the evicted tenants act introduced by Augustine
Birrell enabled 735 tenants, evicted during the land war, to
13be re-instsated at a cost of £390,000. The importance of
this act lay in the fact that it introduced a very limited
form of compulsory purchase for the first time.
In 1909, the finances of the Wyndham act had collapsed
and land purchase had come to a halt. The land act of 1909,
the Birrell act, returned to the system of payment of
landlords that had been used between 1891 and 1903.
Henceforth, they were to be paid directly in land stock,
although the bonus, now calculated on a sliding scale on the
number of years' purchase received, was still to be paid in
cash. The number of years' purchase was the purchase price
divided by the annual rent for the holding. The rate of
14annuity was now 3.5%, payable over 66 years.
7
These were the Irish land law and land purchase codes. 
The recent phase of legislation, which had been highly 
sympathetic to the tenant, had been both begun and ended by 
the Liberals, but had, in the main, been enacted and 
implemented by the Conservatives. But, had the process of 
land purchase been brought to a triumphant conclusion, or 
even to a conclusion at all? A casual student of Irish 
history might certainly think so. For reasons that have as 
much to do with the possibilities of unionist - nationalist 
cooperation that existed at the time, as with the provisions 
of the act itself, the 1903 act has attracted most attention 
and praise in Irish historiography.
[The] Land Act of 1903 provided the basis for 
securing a comprehensive transfer of the ownership of 
agricultural land to the tenant occupiers. This marked 
the completion of the most significa£\t social 
revolution in the modern history of Ireland.
The 1909 act has not been without its supporters.
Charles Townsend described it as the final readjustment of
16land purchase.1 Most historians would, however, have seen
17it, like R.F. Foster, as an adaptation' of the 1903 act. 
While some writers have acknowledged the fact that further 
legislation did prove necessary, the general attitude is best 
summed up by the following comment from R.B. McDowell.
During the first decade of the twentieth century 
the moderate nationalists could point with pride to 
what had been won by constitutional methods - the 
elimination of landlordism, the transfer of county 
government to democratically elected county councils 
and the creation of the National University.
The standard interpretation of twentieth century Irish 
history virtually ignores the question of land ownership, 
deeming it to have been solved by two acts of legislation
8
which, despite their dates, are to be understood only in a 
nineteenth century context, and which have little or no 
relevance to the new century. Yet, to informed observers 
after 1910, such a viewpoint would have seemed, at best, 
highly exaggerated, while the idea that landlordism had been 
eliminated would have seemed ridiculous, given that the 
evidence to the contrary was right before their eyes. Land 
purchase had not yet left the main political stage.
On 4 December 1916, Sir Henry Doran, the man responsible
for the estates business of the CDB, circulated a memorandum
on the subject of land purchase to his colleagues on the 
19Board. This had been on the agenda at the previous two
Board meetings, but had been postponed until the Chief
Secretary could attend. In the meantime, Doran sought to
ensure that each Board member was fully acquainted with all
the relevant facts as he saw them. The memo took the form of
a series of questions and answers with Doran providing his
solutions to the problems outlined. His opening question was
perhaps the easiest to answer. It simply asked:
Q. (I) : (a) Have the operations of the Land
Purchase Acts ceased’
(b) If so, why?
The answer to the first part was a resounding 'yes' and
he immediately attempted to answer the second part.
Negotiations for the purchase of Estates or 
holdings have practically ceased becaug<= landlords will 
not sell their estates for land stock.
Shortly after the outbreak of war, the Treasury had 
ordered the CDB to suspend land purchase, whether for cash or 
for stock, but ironically, just two years later, such action
9
would have been unnecessary. The Board had been forced to
withdraw offers totalling £460,437 made in land stock for 86
estates, and it would seem that those landlords were the 
2 2lucky ones. Under the act of 19 09, the Board had made
offers worth £2,659,787 in land stock which had been accepted 
by the vendors. However, between the dates of acceptance of 
these offers and their distribution, a total of £460,457 had
been wiped off the value of this stock by virtue of the
23depreciation of land stock. A particularly bad example
quoted is that of Sir Roger Palmer's estate in County Mayo.
When the vendors accepted the Board's stock offer of £292,000
on 30 October 1911 the market price of land stock was then
85% of its nominal value. In October 1916 it had fallen to
59.25. This involved the vendors in a cash loss of over 
24£75,000. This drastic fall in the value of land stock
tipped many previously financially sound estates over the
edge of insolvency. Others were hanging on grimly.
In many cases the vendors are doing all they can
to delay completion of sale in the hope that by
legislation or 2%oine other change may be made to save 
them from ruin.
This ruin was brought about because the majority of
vendors were forced to sell large amounts of their stock in
order to realise cash to meet the payments due on the many
charges on their estates. In short, Doran's opinion was that
the land act of 1909 was dead and could not be resurrected.
Q. (II): C^g Land Purchase be resumed under the 
existing Acts?
It is not surprising that the answer to this second
question begins with:
There is no hope of reviving stock purchase of 
10
estates under the Act of 1909.
However, the act of 1903 posed more complications. Here 
it was the government, and not the vendor, who was to suffer 
the loss. Under the terms of the act, the vendor was paid in 
cash, which was raised by the issue of 2.75% land stock. 
This stock was at an even greater discount than the 3% stock 
of 1909 and it was necessary to issue a great deal of excess 
stock in order to achieve the agreed cash price. The Estates 
Commissioners are quoted as reporting that from 31 March
1916, about £19 million would be necessary to complete the
2 8purchase of estates pending for sale under the act of 1903.
Added to this there was a bonus payable to the vendors of
these estates. Yet, the nettle must be grasped.
To this the Government, in the absence of 
legislation, are committed, and there does not appear 
to be any reason for assuming that the required cash 
will2 >^e obtained more cheaply a few years hence than 
now.
Perhaps the government were also hoping for a change of
circumstance to save them from ruin.
Q.(Ill): What are the objections, difficulties, 
and advantages of resuming land purchase, considered in 
connection with the value of lands sold and remaining 
unsold?
As he had already dealt with the objections and
difficulties of resuming land purchase under the existing
acts, Doran confined himself, for the moment, to the
advantages involved. He estimated that about a third of the
agricultural land in Ireland, subject to the land purchase
code, remained either unsold or awaiting final closure of 
31sale. This was, he felt, a most unsatisfactory arrangement 
because, from his knowledge of the tenant farmers,1 he felt
27
11
certain that this one third would not continue to pay their 
rents in full to the landlords, while their neighbours were 
actually buying out their holdings for a much smaller annual 
charge. Future events were to vindicate his forecast of such 
difficulty in the collection of rent.
At this stage Doran's attention was diverted away from 
the more immediate guestion of land purchase into more 
general affairs. He had already announced at the start of 
the memorandum that he would have to touch certain political 
issues that were highly sensitive, and he had made the ritual 
declaration that he was solely responsible for the opinions 
that were expressed or implied in the memorandum. The first 
time such a declaration became necessary was when he wondered 
aloud:
Why should the general tax-payer be mulcted to 
make farming members of the community owners of their 
holdings especially as they are the class of all others 
who are giving the least help to win this dreadful war 
or to J^ke any sacrifice for the defence of their own 
homes.
While the context and the details have changed, these 
sentiments have been echoed many times since 1916. He had 
prefaced the remark with the gualification but some say1, 
but this was still a dangerous thought to be lurking in the 
mind of a senior official of the CDB. It would certainly 
have done nothing to bolster the farming community's rapidly 
failing confidence in the CDB if it had become public 
knowledge.
Immediately afterwards, Doran moved on to an even more 
controversial topic, when he discussed the completion of land 
purchase in relation to the advent of home rule. Believing
12
that the solution of the land purchase problem would greatly 
aid the introduction of home rule, he made two proposals for 
the 'solution of the present unsatisfactory situation in 
Ireland.1 A day should be appointed on which the suspended 
home rule act would come into operation, with a 
representative, cross-sectional committee to recommend to 
Parliament, before that day, any amendments it thought 
necessary. The second proposal was simply to complete land 
purchase.
Q. (IV) : If land purchase is to be resumed, 
consider proposed scheme as herein explained for the 
resumption and completion of Land Purchase without 
providing any cash before^t is paid as 'Sinking Fund1 
by the tenant purchasers.
This scheme consisted of three proposals which deserve 
to be quoted in full.
(a) The purchase price of the estate to be paid in 
bonds bearing 5 per cent interest. No bonus.
(b) All chargeants on estate must accept payment 
of their claims in these bonds at face value.
(c) The Treasury to have power to purchase at face 
value so much of those bonds each half year as may be 
necessary to invest in them the half year's instalment 
of sinking fund received from the tenant purchasers and 
also the revenue derived from previous investments in 
same bonds.
The first proposal would certainly have jolted the 
readers of this memorandum. The bonus to vendors in land 
purchase had only been introduced in the Wyndham act, but it 
had rapidly become an integral part of the structure of land 
purchase, and, as with any bonus paid regularly, it soon came 
to be seen as an automatic entitlement. It would seem that 
Doran had been serious about protecting the general tax-payer 
from the exorbitant demands of the rural community whether 
landowner or unpurchased tenant.
If the vendors were to be paid in 5% bonds, this would 
necessarily involve the purchasers paying annuities of 5.25%.
The 0.25% sinking fund would clear the debt in 62 years if
35the sinking fund payments were invested regularly at 5%. 
This could be done by investing the payments in 5% land bonds 
which the Treasury could purchase from the vendors at face 
value. This was the essence of the third proposal. Of equal 
significance was the second suggestion. This would help to 
protect the vendors from depreciation of their 5% bonds as 
they would no longer have to raise cash to pay off those to 
whom they were indebted.
Apart from these changes in the financial terms, land 
purchase was to proceed in very much the same way as it had 
done under the acts of 1903 and 1909. This meant that the 
landlord and tenant would find a mutually acceptable price, 
subject to the sanction of the CDB or the Estates 
Commissioners.
In what was the most unrealistic passage in the 
document, Doran speculated that the tenants would probably be 
looking for the same reduction from rent to annuity as their 
neighbours would have received since 1903, but that some
might be willing to pay a shilling more in the pound, in
3 6order to obtain a speedy settlement. His calculations,
based on the same reductions as previously granted, showed 
that landlords would have generally received a greater annual 
income under his proposals, than they would under the terms
of the 1909 act, despite a smaller purchase price and the
37 .absence of a bonus. This depended on the vendors retaining
14
their stock, as the whole plan rested on the higher rate of 
interest, and a consequently lower rate of sinking fund 
payments. A curious anomaly is that the vendor's expenses of 
sale were calculated at an average of around 7% of the
purchase price for the acts of 1903 and 1909, but at only 5%
3 8for the new scheme. No explanation was offered for this
difference, and, without it, the terms of the 1909 act would 
generally have been more attractive to the vendor.
Doran suggested that the vendors would do well to strike 
bargains with their tenants, and the reason for this became 
clear, as he gave the vendors an incentive to sell promptly.
Any landlord of an agricultural estate who has not 
arranged to sell it or any agricultural holding thereon 
within five years after the passing of this proposed 
Act may be required to sell and the tenanj^ to buy at 
prices fixed by the Estates Commissioners.
It is not entirely clear whether this proposal for 
compulsory purchase was intended to be used selectively, in 
particular circumstances and cases as under the 1909 act, or 
whether it was a universal and all-embracing proposal that 
would have put a definite time limit on the existence of the 
landlord in Ireland.
Q.(V): If proposed scheme or any other scheme be 
approved, when is it advisable to resume land purchase?
Q.(VI): Is it advisable to revive, by any special 
means, land purchase in the congested dis^icts while 
it is not operative in the rest of Ireland?
The answers given to these questions were that land 
purchase should only be revived within the area of the CDB in 
conjunction with the rest of the country and as part of a 
general political settlement.
It is not known what the members of the CDB thought of
15
Sir Henry Doran's memorandum, or what action, if any, was 
taken as a result of it, but we do know that it was not 
shelved away and forgotten about, at least not for a couple 
of years. The year after it was written, 1917, this 
insightful document was submitted as part of Sir Henry's 
evidence to the land purchase sub-committee of the Irish 
convention.
16
The land purchase sub-committee of the Irish convention:
The problems of pending and completed sales
In 1917, the political scene in Ireland was in chaos. 
It seemed that the home rule party was losing its grip and 
that Sinn Fein was rapidly becoming the new power in the 
land. When Count Plunkett won the North Roscommon
by-election in January of that year, standing as an
independent, but with the wholehearted support of Sinn Fein,
John Redmond was in despair. He wrote a draft memorandum in
which he would appeal to the Irish people not to be led 
astray:
Into courses which must end in immediate defeat of 
their hopes o^ the present and permanent disaster to 
their country.
Perhaps people had become tired of old faces, and a
younger generation of leaders should be sought.
Let the Irish people replace us, by all means, by 
other, and I hope, better men, if they so choose.
Predictably enough, Redmond's colleagues made sure that 
this memorandum was not published. Such pessimism by its 
leader would undoubtedly have destroyed the party.
While there were many fundamental differences in policy 
between Sinn Fein and the home rule party, perhaps one, above 
all others contributed to Redmond's despair. More than the 
electoral defeat itself, the declared policy of Sinn Fein, 
and of Count Plunkett, to refrain from taking its place in
CHAPTER ONE
17
Westminster, undermined the whole raison d'etre of the party. 
While it had had its baptism in the extra-parliamentary 
agitation of the land war, and some of its members had been 
involved with the plan of campaign, it had increasingly come 
to regard the house of commons as its principal theatre of 
operations. It had focused all its energies on the 
achievement of its aims by constitutional means, and success 
was to be measured in the finer points of legislative detail. 
Its members were skilled parliamentarians, expert in the 
techniques of obstruction, negotiation and committee-room 
bargaining. On its home ground, so to speak, the home rule 
party provided extremely formidable opposition to any 
nationalist grouping attempting to challenge its dominance, 
as both William O'Brien and Tim Healy had discovered.
Sinn Fein dealt with this problem by side-stepping it. 
Its abstentionist policy left the home rule party fighting an 
enemy it couldn't see. By switching the battleground away 
from Westminster, Sinn Fein seized the initiative in the 
by-elections of 1917. The government, who were also denied 
the opportunity of encountering Sinn Fein at first hand in 
the house of commons, failed to understand the movement or to 
appreciate the nature and extent of its support. Thus, on 
numerous occasions in 1917 and 1918 it played right in to the 
hands of Sinn Fein, by arresting members before elections, by 
the conscription crisis and by the so-called 'German plot.'
In retrospect, Sinn Fein's policy of abstention seems 
like a masterstroke, but in reality it was a massive gamble, 
with the stakes being the undivided allegiance of the
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nationalist community. So long as the unionists remained 
intransigent, and so long as the government refused either to 
coerce the unionists or to grant an acceptable measure of 
home rule, then Sinn Fein could build on its support, and the 
home rule party would increasingly be seen as ineffectual and 
out of touch. Yet, the possibility remained that agreement 
could be reached with the unionists or alternatively, and for 
some people preferably, the government could be persuaded to 
over-ride unionist objections and to proceed with home rule. 
Then the credit might go to those in the appropriate position 
to receive it, the home rule party, and the newly constructed 
edifice of Sinn Fein might crumble and its support melt back 
towards the triumphant Redmond.
It was in these circumstances that the Irish convention 
came into being. Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, was about 
to offer the home rule party immediate implementation of home 
rule, but the six counties were to be excluded for a period
of five years, after which time the question of their
2permanent status would be reconsidered. When Redmond heard, 
informally, of these proposals from the Marquess of Crewe, 
Leader of the house of lords, at a banquet in honour of 
General Smuts, he rejected them out of hand. Then, perhaps 
inspired by South Africa's recent successful experience in 
tackling constitutional problems at a round table conference, 
he wondered if a similar approach could be tried in Ireland, 
asking if:
It would be the right course to copy what had been 
done in the dominions and leave the ^constitutional 
question to a convention entirely Irish.
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This conversation was immediately reported to Lloyd
George by Crewe. The following day, 16 May 1917, the Prime
Minister conveyed his proposals in a letter to the leaders of
the Irish parties. As well as his own proposal for immediate
home rule with partition, he also included as 'a last
resort', an alternative plan for an Irish convention which
the government would support. The responses from the various
parties to the latter proposal were reasonably encouraging,
which was in itself no mean achievement. On 21 May, Lloyd
George announced in the commons that a convention was to be
set up. Should it reach substantial agreement' on a
proposed new constitution, then the government would be
4willing to give this agreement legislative effect.
The convention's membership was to include 'all leading
interests, classes, creeds, and phases of thought in 
5Ireland1. To this end, representatives were taken from the 
home rule party, the Ulster party, southern unionists, the 
Irish peers, the major churches, the various chambers of 
commerce and labour associations. The largest single block 
of members was that of the delegates from the local 
authorities; the county councils and urban district councils. 
Outside of the delegates from the six counties, these were, 
almost to a man, supporters of the home rule party. The 
government directly nominated a number of men who were 
prominent in business, social or academic circles.
Sinn Fein was offered five places at the convention, the 
same number as the home rule party, but it turned them down. 
This was the logical consequence of its abstentionist policy,
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and was merely taking the gamble of hoping that the home rule 
party would fail, one step further. It kept in touch with 
the proceedings through Edward MacLysaght, a young publisher 
who was highly sympathetic to the party, with almost daily 
briefings while the convention was in session. Also 
nominated as independent nationalists were William Martin 
Murphy and the poet A.E.. Although Alice Stopford Green was 
considered at one stage as a possible replacement for a Sinn 
Fein delegate, there were no women in the convention 
membership.7
This account of the origins of the convention, which 
follows closely that given by R.B. McDowell, casts 
considerable doubt on the oft-repeated accusation by 
historians, that the convention was nothing more than a plot 
by Lloyd George to placate American public opinion, and so 
smooth out any obstacles to the full participation of the 
U.S. in the war, while also allowing the government to, 
temporarily at least, rid itself of an annoying distraction 
from the war effort. Though these were certainly very 
welcome benefits from the convention policy for the 
government, it has to be remembered that the convention was 
suggested in the first place by John Redmond, who obviously 
had very different hopes in mind for it. For Redmond, this 
would probably be his last chance to regain control of the 
situation and to re-establish the home rule party as the 
dominant nationalist party in Ireland. At this stage, it 
would be winner take all.
The primary purpose of the convention was, of course, to
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come to an agreement on a new constitution. This involved 
the members in discussion of, the powers and composition of 
an Irish parliament, partition, and the question of who 
should control the vital financial matters of taxation, 
foreign trade and customs and excise. The resolution of these 
issues, crucial and contentious as they were, would not 
however automatically guarantee stability. In search of such 
stability, the convention set up, in the Autumn of 1917, a 
number of sub-committees to examine electoral law, defence 
and police, and land purchase. Early in 1918, another 
sub-committee was appointed to consider the need for local 
authority housing in urban areas. It has been suggested by 
McDowell that these sub-committees were nothing more than an 
attempt to distract from an awkward dispute in the 
convention. This is to gravely underestimate the seriousness 
with which the committee members undertook their tasks, and 
the tremendous interest of the convention delegates in the 
various reports.
The chairman of the convention was Sir Horace Plunkett, 
a man who had already had a fascinating career. Born in Co. 
Meath, he had, amongst other things, been the founder of the 
Irish co-operative movement, a unionist M.P., the inspiration 
and first vice-president of the Department of Agriculture and 
Technical Instruction, and a member of the first Congested 
Districts Board. With such a background, Plunkett was always 
likely to be sympathetic to any attempt to finally resolve 
the land question. For the duration of the convention, he 
sent regular reports, highly animated in style and tone, on
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the proceedings to the king. Lord Southborough, the 
secretary to the convention, wryly observed that the king was 
probably the only senior figure in the British establishment
gnot to read them. In these reports Plunkett explained why 
the land purchase sub-committee was set up.
In Ireland the political and the agrarian 
questions have always been so intertwined that no
settlement of the former could make a prosperous and 
contented country while any real grievance remained
owing to the unsettlement of the latter. Such a 
grievance, though not of formidable dimensions, does 
still exist. - - - Moreover, the politico-agrarian
history of Ireland in the last two generations goes far 
to justify the decision of the Convention to complete 
land purchase in order that the Irish Pai^iament may 
start without a land question on its hands.
The dangers involved in ignoring the land question were 
far greater than the dangers faced in addressing it. 
Plunkett argued that at any moment trouble could erupt on an 
estate and, as had happened before, spark off widespread 
agitation, reviving hostilities between landlords and 
tenants. This scenario would render compromise between the 
nationalists and the southern unionists, in particular,
virtually impossible and would, in all probability, wreck the 
convention.
Another, more noble, motive was also detected by 
Plunkett.
Nothing in our deliberations has been more 
gratifying than the oft-expressed desire on the part of 
the Nationalists to give every inducement to their 
Unionist fellow-countr^-yen to take a prominent part in 
Irish self-government.
Here was the legacy of the 1902 land conference. It had 
been the most successful example of collaboration between 
unionists and nationalists, and had briefly given rise to
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hopes of a new era in Irish politics, before these hopes were 
quickly dashed. Plunkett himself, of course, had been the 
supreme example of a unionist who had engaged fully the task 
of Irish administration, not as an imperial statesman or 
centralising bureaucrat, but as a practical innovator and 
disciple of self-help.
The most prominent member of the committee was its
chairman, Lord Anthony McDonnell. Born in Co. Mayo, and by
then aged 73, he had had a long and very distinguished career
in the British civil service. He had been Lieutenant
Governor of an Indian province in the 1890's where he had
12been known as the 'Bengal tiger1. He had been Under
Secretary for Ireland from 1902-8, with more responsibility
than was usual for the holder of that office. More
significantly for his new role, he had been a staunch
supporter of the land conference and, in his capacity as
Under Secretary, had had a direct influence on the framing of
the subsequent Wyndham act. He had incurred the wrath of
unionists in 1904, for his collaboration with Lord Dunraven
on proposals for devolution, and again in 1907, when he aided
Augustine Birrell in his ill-fated Irish Councils Bill. It
was said of him, that to the unionists he appeared to be a
home ruler, while to the home rulers he appeared a renegade.
Not surprisingly then, he was a Liberal, and a government
13nominee to the convention.
Dr Denis Kelly, the Bishop of Ross, participated as a 
representative of the Catholic hierarchy. A staunch
supporter of the home rule party, he was a noted expert in
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Irish accounts and fiscal matters. He had been a member of a
number of government committees dealing with Irish affairs,
including the Primrose committee on Irish Finance, which had
been set up in 1912 to examine the financial implications of 
14home rule Michael Barry, a farmer and shopkeeper, was
representing Cork Co. Council, while J.J. Clancy, a sitting
home rule party M.P., barrister and journalist, was, like the
15Bishop of Ross, an expert on public finance.
Lord Oranmore and Brown was a representative of the
Irish peers, and was listed as a landowner by profession.
Along with Lord Oranmore, the Unionist representatives were
Michael Knight, a Co. Monaghan solicitor, and George Stewart,
a large scale land agent and director of the Bank of Ireland,
16who was a southern unionist.
This meant that the political representation on the
committee consisted of three unionists, three nationalists
and one Liberal. The secretary to the committee was Walter
Callan. Callan, trained in the Land Commission, had been
secretary to the royal commission on congestion, on whose
17report the land act of 1909 had been largely based.
Although, according to its own report, the committee
was not appointed until 1 November 1917, the first meeting
18had already been held as early as 23 October. At their
tenth meeting on 4 December, the members signed a report 
which was before the convention for discussion from 8-10 
January 1918. The committee then reconvened to consider a 
number of suggested amendments, and at the thirteenth meeting 
on 23 January, a final revised report was signed. On 10
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January, Dr Patrick O'Donnell, Bishop of Raphoe, was
nominated as a replacement for the Bishop of Ross, who was
ill. However, before the final report was signed, Dr Kelly's
approval of the changes made was obtained, and his signature,
19and not Dr O'Donnell's, appeared on the report.
From the first paragraph of the report, the members made
it quite clear that their work was based on the assumption
that some form of home rule would be granted and the various
problems were considered in that light. While they wished
'to offer no opinion, in this Report, as to the desirability
of this change,1 all recommendations were to be dependent on
2 0home rule being implemented.
The Sub-Committee carried out their enquiries and 
made their report on the assumption that the solution 
of the problem of Land Purchase was required as part of
a large scheme for recasting the framework of
government in Ireland. To effect this, and to bring 
about the unanimous Report which the Sub-Committee 
presented, the representatives both of the landlords 
and the tenants agreed to sacrifices which they would 
be unwilling to make except as a necessary Jp-prt of a 
large scheme for bringing peace into Ireland.
This meant that the three unionist members of the 
committee were in the highly unusual position of being 
signatories to a report whose recommendations, in their 
complete form, they had no wish to see implemented.
The report began by dealing with land already sold under 
the land purchase acts. The second schedule to the report 
outlined the position then current with regard to the 
collection of purchase annuities and the liability for their 
non-payment. As the annuities due for collection amounted to
over £2.75 million at the time, this was a matter of
considerable importance. In fact, over £98.5 million was
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advanced for the purposes of land purchase in the period from
1870 to 31 March 1917, with another £1.5 million contributed
22in cash by the purchasers themselves.
The central idea behind land purchase legislation, was 
that the government should provide the tenant-purchaser with 
a fixed interest loan, usually referred to as an advance, at 
as low a rate as possible to enable him to purchase his 
holding. Lest temptation should cross the path of the 
purchaser, and for administrative reasons, this advance was 
paid directly by the Estates Commissioners, or by the CDB, to 
the landlord, who no longer had to worry about the collection 
of rent or persistent defaulters.
The rate of interest of the advance was the lowest rate 
available to the government at the time the particular piece 
of legislation, under which the advance was given, was 
passed. Since the government could always borrow money more 
cheaply than commercial concerns or private individuals, this 
meant that the purchaser was getting the best deal possible. 
The annuity was the purchaser's annual repayment on the 
advance, and was calculated as a percentage of the total 
price, with the percentage being slightly higher than the 
rate of interest. The annuity was divided into two parts: 
interest payments and sinking fund payments. The interest 
payment was the larger part of the annuity and was fixed at 
the rate the government had borrowed.
The sinking fund payment was the portion of the 
purchaser's annuity intended to amortise the capital of his 
loan, i.e. to clear his debt. This was done by investing the
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payments into the sinking fund until the fund had accumulated 
sufficient interest to pay off the capital of the original 
advance. Because the rate of interest of the advance was 
fixed at the outset, the annuity also remained fixed and the 
purchasers were insulated, to a very large degree, from the 
vagaries of the financial markets. This was a real boon in 
times of rising interest rates. How complete this insulation 
was, depended on whether or not the period of repayment had 
also been fixed, and this, in turn, depended on the 
legislation under which the transaction had taken place.
Under the acts prior to 1891, over £10 million had been 
advanced for land purchase. The annuities were calculated to
be sufficient to pay off the debt in a fixed period of 49
2 3 ■years. However, although both the annuity and the period
of repayment were originally fixed, most purchasers took
advantage of an offer which allowed them to reduce the
sinking fund payment in their annuity for three successive
decades. This prolonged the period of repayment to 79 years
in most cases. Technically, both the annuity and the period
of repayment were still fixed in the sense that they were
both unaffected by changes in the marketplace interest rates.
Any loss incurred by the Land Commission, which was the
body responsible for the collection of annuities, arising
from non-payment of annuities due under these acts, was
recouped from public funds, specifically provided by the
annual Public Works Loans acts. However, the total loss
caused by defaulters on these sales, between 1881 and 1917,
24was just over £5,000, with an annual average of about £140.
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None of these early acts had been particularly favourable to 
the purchaser, so the numbers availing of their terms were 
low, while those who did purchase were often strong tenants 
who could well afford the burden. These factors help to 
explain why the figure was so low.
Under the acts of 1891-6 over £13 million was advanced 
25to purchasers. The period of repayment was not fixed under 
these acts, but it was estimated that the annuities would, if 
paid regularly, amortise the debt in 42.5 years, or 72.5 
years in the case of a purchaser who took the three decadal 
reductions. This estimation was based on the assumption that 
the sinking fund payments would be reinvested at the same 
rate. As the interest rates generally available were rising, 
then the sinking fund payments were earning more, and the 
accumulated amount in the sinking fund was increasing more 
rapidly. This meant that higher interest rates would see the 
debt amortised sooner than would otherwise have been the case 
and at no extra cost to the purchaser. Conversely, lower 
interest rates would have meant a longer period of repayment 
at the purchaser's expense. The unusual result was that 
these debtors were benefiting from higher interest rates.
The Wyndham act was, of course, a tremendous success,
2 6and under its terms £67 million was advanced to purchasers. 
The annuity was fixed at 3.25%, 2.75% for interest and 0.5%
for sinking fund payments. If the sinking fund payments were
reinvested at the 2.75% rate, then the period of repayment 
would last 68.5 years. If, on the other hand, they were
invested continuously at 5%, which was the prevailing rate in
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1917, then the debt would be cleared in 48.5 years. The
rate actually used was set under Treasury rules at 2.75%, as
the sinking fund payments were used to provide advances for
new sales. By 1917, sinking fund payments were totalling
over £500,000 per annum and their use in that manner was a
2 8cost saving exercise for the Treasury.
Similarly with the 1909 act, under which £8 million was
2 9 .advanced. The interest now was at 3% and the sinking fund
payment at 0.5%. Regular investment of the sinking fund
payments at 3%, would involve a period of repayment of 65 
3 0years. This was the rate fixed by the Treasury, as they
were using the payments to make fresh advances, as with cases
under the 1903 act. Once land purchase had been completed,
and no new advances needed to be made, then the sinking fund
payments could be invested at the market rate, which in all
probability would be higher than either 2.75% or 3%, and the
period of repayment thereby shortened.
The annuities were due to be paid on the traditional
gale days' of 1 May and 1 November. If payment wasn't made,
then an elaborate procedure for the recovery of arrears would
31be set m  motion. A few weeks after the gale day, a
solicitor's letter would be sent to the errant purchaser. 
This would be followed by the issuing of a civil bill and the 
obtaining of a decree at Quarter Sessions. If payment was 
still not forthcoming after another demand, then the sheriff 
would be sent to seize the debtor's goods. In the worst 
cases, where there were not enough goods to meet the arrears, 
the Land Commission would sell the holding. It was very rare
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for the procedure to go this far, as most cases of arrears 
were simply matters of late payment, rather than a complete 
failure to pay. When a forced sale took place the Land 
Commission generally recovered all outstanding debts. This 
was because the holding was worth much more than the sum 
which had been advanced for its purchase. The advance 
covered the landlord's interest in the holding, but the 
purchaser had had a tenant right to begin with and this too 
could be sold by the Land Commission. Occasionally, a loss
was incurred 'due to the difficulty of effecting a sale in
3 2 .consequence of local feeling.1 Memories of bailiffs and
evictions ran very deep in some localities.
Where any loss was incurred, it was the liability of the 
guarantee fund. The guarantee fund could roughly be said to 
have been the central holding account for the grants payable 
to Irish local authorities. The government paid into the 
guarantee fund all grants normally due to the local
authorities, and these were then distributed to their
respective places. However, the amounts distributed were 
reduced by the amount of arrears due to the Land Commission 
at the given time. The system had been refined to the point 
where each County Council had to bear the loss that was 
caused by the non-payment of annuities that were due from 
their area, while the names of defaulters were forwarded by 
the Land Commission to the County Councils for local
publication. Since a shortfall in the grant received from 
the government meant either a decrease in services or an
increase in rates, public opinion did not generally look
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favourably on persistent defaulters.
The permanent loss caused by defaulters to the guarantee 
fund was described in the report as 'infinitesimal.1 This 
was because the great bulk of arrears was caused by late 
payment rather than by a complete failure to pay. On a 
dividend day, when the Land Commission was required to pay 
the interest due to stockholders, any shortfall in annuities 
was covered by money drawn -from the guarantee fund. However, 
when the Land Commission recovered those arrears from the 
purchasers, they paid them back into the guarantee fund and 
from there they went to the proper local authority. In some 
years the amount collected in annuities might be greater than 
the amount due. In the year ended 31 March 1917, the amount
collected was £2,558,216, which was almost £3,000 more than
3 3the amount due for that year. The amount of arrears
outstanding on that date, £25,120, was therefore £3,000 less 
than the previous year's figure. Thus, more money might be 
paid into the guarantee fund in a given year than drawn from 
it.
While, under the acts passed prior to 1891, the 
liability for non-payment of annuities fell to the central 
funds of the United Kingdom, the liability of Irish 
rate-payers for defaulters, under subsequent acts, meant that 
Irish funds were deemed to be ultimately responsible for the 
full payment of these annuities. Under the proposals 
contained in both the home rule bill of 1893 and the 
Government of Ireland Act, 1914, this situation was to 
continue. The Irish Consolidated Fund, or central exchequer,
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was to be liable for non-payment of annuities, and it was to
be at the discretion of the Irish government as to how this
liability was to be shared out locally. As it was to take
control of the revenues which went into the guarantee fund,
it would have the option of continuing the old system,
including the division of responsibility to each county.
These proposals were endorsed in the report, which went on to
recommend that, since the loss involved would be practically
negligible, the Irish government should also accept liability
for the annuities payable under the acts passed prior to 
341891.
We therefore recommend that all purchase annuities 
should be collected by a department of the Irish 
Government, that the annuities should be paid over to 
the Consolidated Fund of Great Britain and Ireland on 
fixed dates, and that such payment s^guld be a first 
charge on the Irish Consolidated Fund.
This passage differed significantly in one important
respect from the proposals contained in the 1893 Bill and the
1914 act. These measures treated the administration of land
purchase as a reserved service, or as part of the Irish
administration, that would, temporarily at least, continue to
be run from Westminster. This meant that the Imperial
government would continue to collect the annuities. However,
as the report pointed out, any slackness on the part of the
Imperial government in collecting the annuities, would result
not in any loss to itself, but instead would be to the cost
of the Irish government. A second objection was that the
Imperial government would have to pursue its claims against
defaulters through the Irish legal system, and that this
would result in ' an un-necessary case of concurrent
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O  fZjurisdictions.1 This proposal is dismissed in a single
pithy sentence.
We are of opinion that the Government that is 
responsible for any loss caused by the non-payment of 
annuities shoulc^ be charged with the collection of 
these annuities.
While the Irish government was to assume responsibility
for the collection of annuities, the cost involved in
carrying out this task was to be regarded as Imperial
expenditure. The whole structure of land purchase
legislation and administration had been erected and
maintained by the Imperial government, and, it was argued, it
had a moral obligation to complete the job which it had
begun. Aware of the difficulties involved in one
administration paying for work being done by another, the
committee inserted a proviso to the effect that ' it would
conduce to economical administration and obviate friction1 if
the amount recoverable by the Irish government in respect of
the cost of collection was limited to a percentage of the
3 8total due in annuities.
Having allocated responsibility for the collection of 
purchasers1 annuities, as well as the liability for their 
non-payment, the report then turned towards another aspect of 
the system of financing land purchase that concerned 
completed sales. Under the terms of the Wyndham Act, 
vendors, i.e. the landlords, were to be paid in cash for the 
sale of their property. This cash was to be raised by the 
issuing and sale of land stock by the government. By 
guaranteeing an annual return at a fixed rate of interest, 
government stock and bonds have been a common method for
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governments to borrow money from investors on the open 
market, and land stock was stock issued specifically for the 
purpose of financing land purchase. The stock created under
the 1903 act was at 2.75%, which meant that whoever bought
this stock would get an annual return of 2.75% on their 
investment. This return would be covered by the interest 
payment of the purchaser's annuity, which was fixed at 2.75% 
of the price. The sinking fund payment of 0.5% would be used 
to clear the purchaser's debt and, from the government's 
point of view, redeem the stock.
The Wyndham act proved to be an outstanding success for
both landlords and tenants, but it brought mixed blessings
for the government. Soon after the passing of the act,
marketplace interest rates began to rise, and an annual
return of 2.75%, even if guaranteed, no longer appeared so
attractive to investors. Selling this stock at par, i.e. at
face value, soon became an impossible task for the
government. The enormous volume of sales taking place under
the act meant that huge amounts of stock were constantly
being created and sold; a situation which did nothing to
increase the value of the stock. The result was that the
government were forced to sell the stock at a discount. For
the £67 million advanced under the act, it was found
necessary to create, on average, £115 stock in order to raise 
39£100 cash. The purchaser's annuity, however, was
calculated as a percentage of the cash price paid to the 
vendor, and not on the basis of the amount of stock sold, and 
the annuity would only be sufficient to cover the interest
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and sinking fund payments due on £100 stock. Another source 
was needed to meet the payments due on the balance of £15 
stock. This balance was known as excess stock.
Section 36 (6) of the 1903 act decreed that the 
liability for payments due on excess stock should fall on the 
guarantee fund, and, more specifically, should fall firstly 
on the Ireland Development Grant within the guarantee fund. 
When new grants were being given towards education in 
England, Scotland, and Wales in 1902, the government promised 
to do likewise in Ireland, and the following year, the 
Ireland Development Grant was set up, with an annual total of 
£185,000.40 £20,000 was to be given to the CDB and £5,000 to
Trinity College, Dublin. The remaining £160,000 was to go 
into the guarantee fund, but what was not needed there, to 
meet the charges due on excess stock, would be used for the 
improvement of education, the transport system and the 
promotion of economic development. Each year, however, there 
was less to spend in these areas as the amount drawn out to 
cover excess stock increased steadily.
In 1909 it became apparent that, as land purchase 
progressed, the charges for excess stock would not only 
absorb completely the Ireland Development Grant, but would 
also absorb the death duty grant and half of the agricultural 
grant in the guarantee fund. As this would have caused the 
finances of many of the County Councils around the country to 
collapse, it was decided that once the money in the Ireland 
Development Grant had been exhausted, then parliament would 
vote the remainder needed to cover the charges due on excess
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stock. This first occurred in 1910, and in the year ended 31
March 1917, in addition to the £160,000 from the Ireland
Development Grant, the sum paid out by parliament for this
41purpose alone was £267,740.
Under the act of 1909, the vendors were paid the agreed 
price directly in stock. Since generally, this did not 
involve any cash being raised, there were no problems with 
excess stock, or at least, very little. A small number of 
cases, involving final offers and compulsory purchase orders 
made by either the Estates Commissioners or the CDB, required 
payment in cash, which meant that there would also be 
payments in respect of excess stock. These payments were 
minor in comparison with those made under the 1903 act, and 
were included in the £268,000 voted by parliament.
In an effort to reduce the burden of excess stock, the 
Land Commission used the sinking fund payments made by 
existing purchasers, as part of their annuities, to provide 
cash for the advances given to new vendors. In effect, the 
sinking fund payments were being used to purchase, as an 
investment for the sinking fund, newly created 2.75% stock, 
or in the case of the 1909 act, 3% stock, at face value. 
Because this stock was being purchased at par, there was no 
need in these cases for excess stock to be created. This use 
of the £500,000 received annually in sinking fund payments,
represented considerable savings for the government, at the
42cost to the purchaser of prolonging his repayments.
Another attempt to reduce the amount of excess stock 
needed was made in the 1909 act, by offering vendors who had
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already signed agreements to sell under the terms of the 
Wyndham act, special priority in having their cases dealt 
with, if they accepted payment either completely in 2.75% 
stock or else half in stock and half in cash. Many vendors, 
tempted by the prospect of avoiding the long delays normally
involved in the process, accepted the offer and £14 million
4 3 ■was advanced in this way. Since most of this was in stock,
less excess stock had to be created.
Under the 1903 act, £12 million was set aside to provide
the vendors with a bonus and to make agreement between vendor
44and purchaser on the price easier. It was assumed that the
completion of land purchase would not take more than £100
million, so the bonus was paid at a standard rate of 12% of
the price. In 1908, it was realised that it was going to
take considerably more than £100 million to complete land
purchase, so the Treasury reduced the rate of the bonus to
just 3%. The following year, the 1909 act removed the limit
of £12 million, and altered the method of calculating the
bonus, so that a new system of graded bonuses, which depended
on the number of years' purchase which the vendor received,
came into operation. Unlike the advances made in respect of
price, the bonus, which averaged at 10%, was still paid in 
4 5cash.
The financing of the bonus was, in certain respects, 
similar to the financing of excess stock. Stock had to be 
issued and sold in order to raise the necessary cash for the 
bonus, and this stock was not covered by any purchase 
annuity. On this point, there was no difference between the
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terms of the 1903 and 1909 acts. It had been realised from
the outset that the government would have to pay the interest
and sinking fund payments due on the stock that was issued to
pay the cash bonus. What was not expected was that this
stock would be so drastically depreciated, and that, in order
to pay the bonus, it would be necessary to create, on top of
the expected amount of bonus stock, what was in effect,
excess stock, though it was not officially categorised as
such. The government was paying doubly for the dubious
privilege of providing this cash bonus. In the year ended 31
March 1917, this privilege cost the government £325,000 in
4 6interest and sinking fund payments.
Taking together the payments required in respect of
excess stock and bonus, the annual cost of completed sales to
the government was £753,000, or roughly 1% of the total
47amount advanced under the acts of 1903 and 1909. £160,000
was paid from the Ireland Development Grant and £593,000 was
provided as part of the annual vote for the Land
4 8Commission. The report found that this charge was 'clearly
49an Imperial obligation.' It recommended that the charges
should be paid firstly out of the Irish Consolidated Fund,
but that the Irish government should either be subsequently
repaid for this by the Imperial government, or that the
amount should be calculated as part of any contribution the
50Irish government would make towards Imperial expenditure.
The third of the 'problems connected with completed 
sales1 was the question of who should have responsibility for 
the powers that the Land Commission exercised over holdings
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that were in the process of being purchased. These powers 
were quite considerable and included: the power to prevent
the sub-letting, mortgaging or sale of such holdings, the 
right to determine boundary disputes, to prosecute for breach 
of turbary or timber regulations, and certain claims in 
respect of mineral or sporting rights. In keeping with the 
policy of handing over to the Irish government responsibility 
for the collection of annuities, the report recommended that 
these powers too should be controlled by the Irish 
government.51
The report then turned its attention towards the 
problems associated with the 100,000 holdings, where 
agreements for sale had been signed by all parties, but, 
owing to the huge backlog of cases, the advances had not been 
made and the final closures of the sales had been left 
pending.
We are of opinion that the inauguration of a new 
system of Irish Government renders it imperat^e that 
all pending cases should be speedily completed.
To achieve this, the report recommended that the money 
required, in cash and in stock, should be provided, and the 
sales completed, within three years at most, from the date on 
which the recommendations of the report would be put into 
law; if they were accepted by the government. This would not 
be a simple task, however, as the sums involved were quite 
substantial.
The majority of these sales had been agreed under the 
terms of the 1903 act, which meant that £18 million had to be 
provided in cash if they were to be completed, while a
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further £1 million in cash was required in respect of a
53number of cases pending under the 1909 act. By 1917, £85
excess stock was needed for every £100 cash raised by the
sale of 2.75% stock, and the situation was only marginally
54improved when 3% stock was involved. Even with the use of
sinking fund payments to provide some cash, the annual charge
for excess stock, in respect of those cases then pending,
55would be at least £440,000 when they had been completed.
The payment of the £5 million in stock, mostly at 3%,
needed to complete payments under the 19 09 act did not
present any problems to the government as far as the price
was concerned. Payment of the bonus, however, would be more
expensive. Taking an average bonus of 10% over the £24
million needed to complete all pending cases, the report
calculated that to raise £2.4 million in cash would require
an annual charge for interest and sinking fund of over 
56£140,000. However, £18 million was payable under the 1903 
act, which had a standard bonus of 12%. This would mean that 
£2.76 million was required, and the annual charge would 
consequently rise to approximately £160,000. The annual cost
of completing all pending sales, as calculated by the report,
57would be £580,000. Arguing that the bonus had always been 
seen as 'a free gift to Ireland,' and that the charges for 
excess stock should be viewed similarly, the report 
recommended that this sum should be regarded as Imperial 
expenditure and treated accordingly.^
The Land Commission was to remain a reserved service in 
regard to the various powers it held over pending cases, but
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only on the understanding that these cases would be completed 
in the time allotted. Once this took place, the cases were 
to be treated in the same manner as those completed before 
the report was written. The Irish government would assume 
responsibility for the collection of annuities, liability for 
their non-payment, and control of the Land Commission, while 
the costs involved in the collection of annuities and the
charges for excess stock and bonuses would be reckoned as
59Imperial expenditure. Of course, once the sale had been
completed and the advance paid, the vendor could not be 
effected by any government action short of repudiating land 
stock, and even this would have no effect on those who had 
sold under the Wyndham act.
When the report came before the Convention in January 
of 1918, a number of the amendments tabled on it were
proposed by members of the committee itself. One such
amendment, proposed by Michael Knight, sought 'the most 
favourable consideration of the Imperial Parliament1 for 
those landlords who had agreed to sell for 3% stock when this
stock was at a price of 84, but who were threatened with ruin
by its fall to 58 by the end of 1917.60
We would suggest that there should be issued in 
addition to the Purchase Money an amount of the 3 per 
cent. Land Stock equal to the difference between the 
maximum and minimum prices to those landlords the sale 
of whose estates were still pending completion by the 
Land Commission at the 31st of December, 1917.
This was the situation that Sir Henry Doran had adverted 
to when he referred to landlords delaying the process of sale 
in the hope that they would be rescued by a change in 
legislation. Any vendor wishing to sell his stock, either to
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pay off debts on his estate, or for any other reason, would 
be severly effected by such a fall in the value of 3% stock, 
and the amendment would have compensated for this. Any
vendor who retained his stock would, on the other hand,
suffer no ill-effects from its fall in value, as the annual 
interest payments he received remained the same regardless. 
By this amendment, such a vendor would, in effect, receive a 
substantially higher price than he had originally agreed to 
accept. This amendment would, if accepted, have negated, 
almost entirely, the benefits to the government of paying the 
vendors in stock rather than in cash, as it would have
involved the creation of a large amount of excess stock at
3%.
The amendment was referred back to the committee, and a 
compromise solution was arrived at.
The difficulty would, we think, be fairly met by 
paying such landlords so much of the purchase money at 
the actual market price that prevailed for the stock at 
the date the agreements to sell were signed, as may be 
proved, to the satisfaction of the Land Commission, to 
be required (over and above the cash bonus, where the 
landlord is the absolute owner) to pay off charges 
which existed at the date of the agreement to sell, and 
still exist.
Since it was only those vendors who needed to sell some 
of their stock, in order to pay off debts on their estate, 
who were effected by the fall in the value of land stock, 
those were the only vendors to be compensated for this fall, 
and only to the extent that they had been effected by it. 
While recognising that vendors who had already received 
payment, had also suffered from depreciated stock, the 
committee wisely decided to refrain from tampering with the
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terms of completed sales. 63
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The land purchase sub-committee of the Irish convention:
The completion of land purchase
The committee's discussions of the problems surrounding 
completed and pending sales, though important in themselves, 
were merely the preliminary to the main focus of its work; 
the discussion of the problems of future sales. Herein lay 
the heart of the report. Consideration of the problems 
connected with future sales absorbed more time in meetings, 
more space in the report, and caused more differences of 
opinion, both amongst the committee members and on the 
convention floor, than all the other issues dealt with by the 
committee combined.
The first question to be considered was just how big the 
problem was. Here, a maze of different statistics presented 
themselves. Land neither sold nor pending for sale, under 
the various land purchase acts, comprised 3 0% of the total 
agricultural area of Ireland, and its poor law valuation was 
36% of the total valuation of the agricultural land of the 
country. These figures would have suggested that the problem 
remaining was one third the size of the total problem, or in 
other words, the purchase money required for future sales 
would be half as much again of the amount either already 
advanced or committed for pending sales. This would imply 
that £62 million would be necessary for the completion of
CHAPTER TWO
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land purchase. However, there were other figures to choose 
from.
By multiplying the annual poor law valuation of the land 
which remained unsold by 20, which, under the acts of 1903-9, 
was the average number of years1 purchase of the poor law
valuation in previous sales, a total of £72 million was
2arrived at. This amount was dismissed in the report, as 
little credence was given to either figure in the 
calculation. As the landowner had obviously always had a 
larger interest in untenanted land, he generally received a 
greater number of years' purchase when selling it, and the 
land remaining to be sold in the country contained a high 
proportion of such land. On the other hand, the rise in 
interest rates meant that the number of years' purchase given 
for land, tenanted or untenanted, would probably be much 
lower in the future. The multiplicand in this equation, 
which was the valuation of land unsold, was also unreliable 
as it included demesnes, townparks, home farms and untenanted 
land outside the area of the CDB, little of which was likely 
to be sold under land purchase legislation.
In the attempt to estimate the size of the problem, a 
different tack was then taken. The agricultural statistics 
of 1915, which were the latest figures available for 
consideration at the time, gave the total number of 
agricultural holdings as 569,426. 105,005 of these were
under one acre, including over 47,000 labourers' cottage 
plots and the vast majority, though not all, of these small 
holdings would be outside the operations of the land purchase
1
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acts. This would leave a total of 470,000 holdings sold or 
likely to be sold under the terms of legislation. Since 
almost 410,000 holdings had been either sold or agreed to be 
sold, something over 60,000 appeared, at first glance, to be 
the most likely number of holdings remaining to be sold. Of 
course, this figure too needed modification. The definition 
of a 'holding' also included demesnes, home farms, and 
untenanted land and most of these holdings had not, or would 
not, come under land purchase legislation. Since many of 
these holdings were included in the category of those with an 
area in excess of 200 acres, numbered in the Agricultural 
Statistics at 10,444 holdings, or were counted in the Census 
Returns for 1911 in the 13,472 holdings with a valuation 
greater than £100, the number of holdings that would be 
affected by land purchase in the future had to lie somewhere 
between 50,000 and 60,000, with the lower figure, according
3to the report, bexng closer to the truth.
Having arrived at an approximate figure for the number 
of holdings still to be sold, the report then tried to 
estimate their total purchase price. The average price of 
holdings already sold was £325, while the average price of 
pending cases was £240. Using these two figures and an 
estimate of 50,000 holdings, the report calculated that the 
total price of tenanted land still to be sold would be 
between £12-16 million. The fact that this land contained a 
higher proportion of the larger tenanted holdings, many of 
which would have exceeded the £3,000 limit, than did the land 
sold or pending for sale, meant that the total amount could
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be even higher, but balancing this was the consideration that 
the high interest rates made it unlikely that the same scale 
of prices would be offered in the future. As its 
deliberations progressed, the committee became increasingly 
pessimistic on this point, with its estimate increasing from 
no more than £12 million to £15 million to finally, a very 
uncertain figure, that was considerably higher1 than £16 
million.4
While the report had begun with a solemn declaration 
that the recommendations contained therein were dependent on 
some form of home rule being implemented, in only paragraph 9 
an exception was admitted.
We are of opinion that the conversion of the 
tenants of the smaller holdings into tenant purchasers 
is inevitable under any form of Government, due regard 
being had to the relief of congestion and the extension 
of tillage.
This was the kernel of the report. Land purchase had 
built up a momentum that was neither possible nor desirable 
to resist. Going backwards or even standing still were no 
longer realistic options. It had long been accepted that 
dual ownership had not provided the answer to the country's 
tenure problems and that the final disappearance of the 
landlords was only a matter of time. The extent of that time 
and the manner of the disappearance were all that remained to 
be decided upon. The Wyndham act had attempted to secure, 
universally, the voluntary surrender by landlords of the 
titles to their lands and its failure to do so, despite its 
extravagantly generous terms, indicated that, for some 
recalcitrants, compulsion would ultimately be necessary. The
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fact that an Irish government might shortly be taking over 
the reins of power, merely gave added impetus to the 
committee's desire that the purchase process be speedily
completed.
Paragraph 9 of the report contained the broad policy 
statements of the committee towards the completion of land 
purchase; outlining the principles on which its proposals 
would be based. Along with the wish to see land purchase 
completed, it listed some of the major qualifications to this 
ambition, not the least of which were those cited above. The 
reference to 'the extension of tillage' was made in the 
specific context of the government's wartime drive for an 
expansion in tillage farming, in the hope of a consequent 
reduction in dependence on overseas food imports. The
reference to 'the relief of congestion1 could have been made 
anytime. Enlargement and improvement of many holdings, with 
these aims in mind, would inevitably delay the transfer of 
ownership. While many holdings were above the legal limit 
for advances, the situation where a landlord retained 'a few 
isolated large holdings' when the rest of his property had 
been sold, was to be avoided. An automatic price fixing 
process was to be introduced to save time, and, though all
untenanted land within the area of the CDB was to be
transferred to the Board, elsewhere such property woul 
generally be left undisturbed. These general policy 
aspirations were translated firstly into three main 
recommendations.
We recommend (a) that the landlord's interest in 
all tenanted land, not excepted below, should be 
automatically transferred either to the occupying
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tenants, or to the State, as represented by the 
Congested Districts Board or the Estates Commissioners, 
for resettlement; (b) that all untenanted land within 
the Board's area not excepted below should be 
automatically transferred from the owner to the Board 
for the same purpose; and (c) that outside the Board's 
area the existing powers of the Estates Commissioners 
to acquire untenant^d land should be preserved and, in 
one case, extended.
These proposals would require legislative change for
their operation, but the report recommended that "the
appointed day', to be fixed by the Lord Lieutenant in
Council, on which the automatic transfers would take place,
be delayed for about three years after the passing of the
act. Voluntary agreements were deemed to be preferable to
sales obtained by compulsion, although it was realised that
neither landlord nor tenant would be likely to agree to
anything that left them worse off than the compulsory terms
that would be known immediately the act was passed. The main
motive for the postponement was that it would allow the CDB
and the Estates Commissioners time to prepare the scheme and
to give first priority to pending cases. It was felt to be
unnecessary to over-extend the staff of the Land Commission
by proceeding with fresh cases straight away, especially
since it was believed that, under these new proposals, their
7work would 'be completed m  a comparatively short time'. In 
the light of subsequent experience, this belief was, to say 
the least, somewhat over-optimistic.
Excluded from the provisions of the proposed act were 
townparks, holdings that were primarily residential, and 
non-agricultural holdings, such as mills or forges. These 
non-agricultural holdings could be sold on to the tenant, if
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agreement to do so was forthcoming from all parties 
concerned; including the CDB or the Estates Commissioners. 
Also excluded from the proposals was land which 'having 
regard to its propinquity to a town possesses, in the opinion 
of the Board or the Estates Commissioners, a substantial
gpotential or actual value or utility as building ground.' 
This proviso was inserted into the report after the 
convention referred back to the committee a number of 
amendments which had a similar purpose but less suitable 
wording. The decision as to whether or not a holding 
belonged to any of these categories would be taken by the CDB 
or the Estates Commissioners, and an appeal could be made 
from them to the Judicial Commissioner.
From the appointed day the landlord would no longer have 
any legal or financial interest in the land he had previously 
owned, and would not be entitled to claim from the tenant the 
rent that had become due since the gale day immediately 
preceding the appointed day. The committee was very careful, 
however, to preserve the landlord's access to the full 
apparatus of the law in recovering arrears of rent, and, lest 
misunderstanding arise, it specifically asserted his 
entitlement to rent accrued between the gale day immediately 
prior to the passing of the proposed legislation and that 
before the appointed day. Thereafter, instead of rent, the 
landlord would receive from the CDB or the Land Commission 
interest on the purchase money for the land, and if the 
purchase money was not received by the landlord within 12 
months of the gale day prior to the appointed day, he would
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be additionally paid, by the relevant authority, 5% interest 
on the bonus due, until such time as the purchase money and 
bonus were paid in full. This was less generous than the
proposal agreed to in the minutes, which was to pay the
9interest on the bonus from the start.
Once the appointed day had passed, the landlord could 
not be affected by events on his former property; such as 
whether or not the land was vested in the tenants by the CDB 
or the Estates Commissioners. This meant that the interest 
of all chargeants, or debtors, could be transferred from the 
land to the purchase money received by the vendor and to the 
interest payable on this money. The Land Commission would 
continue to be responsible for investigating the various 
claims of the chargeants and, after the title to the land had 
been definitely established, would distribute the purchase 
money accordingly.
Within the area of the CDB, the Board would, on the 
appointed day, become the landlord for tenanted land, and the 
tenants would pay to the CDB their existing rent, 'subject to 
such reduction as the Board may deem it desirable to grant. 1 
Provided that the purchase money did not exceed the legal 
limit of £3,000, and that the Board felt that the holding was 
not in need of enlargement, improvement or modification, then 
the land was to be passed as soon as possible to the Land 
Commission for vesting in the tenant, who would then become a 
tenant purchaser. In order to prevent what was termed 'the 
stereotyping of uneconomic holdings1 it was foreseen that 
many holdings would not be vested in this manner, but would
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be retained by the CDB for alteration in some way. The Board 
had considerable powers in this regard: continuing tenants as 
tenants, declaring a tenant to be a purchaser of an 
alternative holding at what the Board would consider a fair 
price, and acquiring a tenant's interest, in whole or in 
part, at a suitable rate of compensation. This last power 
was particularly relevant to cases where the purchase money 
exceeded £3,000. Vesting of such large estates unaltered 
would be hard to defend in such badly congested areas.10
Tenants with holdings which were located outside the
area of the CDB, and whose purchase prices were below the
legal limit, had a less circuitous route to proprietorship.
On the appointed day they would become provisional tenant
purchasers, paying the Land Commission the appropriate
purchase annuity for their holdings, and, barring a decision
by the Estates Commissioners to the contrary, on a date to be
specified in the proposed act, this provisional status would
be dropped and they would become full tenant purchasers.
This new status would be backdated to the appointed day and
the repayment of the purchase price would be reckoned to have
begun from then. However, the tenants would have been paying
the appropriate purchase annuity from the gale day prior to
the appointed day, so that, as this report is worded, they
would lose possibly up to 6 months payments of their
annuities and, since the vendors were receiving interest on
the purchase price, the Land Commission would make a small,
and almost certainly unintentional, profit on the sinking
. . 11fund portions of the annuities.
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As with cases under the control of the CDB, the Estates
Commissioners could decide that a holding was 'uneconomic'
and that some form of enlargement or resettlement was
necessary. In such cases the Estates Commissioners would
12have powers similar to the CDB. The difference m  the
procedure of vesting between holdings inside or outside the 
area of the CDB, reflected the fact that a holding in the 
congested districts was more likely to be withheld for 
improvement.
It had already been established that there was a
significant number of tenanted holdings with purchase prices
over the legal limit of £3,000 which had yet to come under
the operations of the land purchase acts. On the appointed
day, these holdings were to pass to the Estates Commissioners
to whom the tenants would pay their existing rents. Minutes
taken at the committee meetings on 6-8 November 1917, record
a proposal to establish criteria for deciding what should be
done with this land. Favourable consideration was to be
given, in strict order, to tenants with tillage holdings,
with residential grass holdings and, lastly, with
non-residential grass holdings, especially land held under
the eleven months system. In the report itself, this
suggestion was watered down, though not discarded completely.
The Commissioners were to have 'regard to the relief of
congestion, the desirability of increasing the food supply of
the country, and the use made in this respect of such
13holdings by the tenants.' Having taken these factors into 
account, the Commissioners would then have power to do with
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the holding as they saw fit; to acquire the tenant's 
interest, partially or completely, to continue the tenant as 
tenant, or to sell the holding in its entirety to the tenant, 
regardless of the price limitations.
In a short paragraph the report advocated that the CDB 
and the Estates Commissioners be given the appropriate powers 
necessary to complete the proposed sales properly. These 
powers included the authority to deal with disputes over 
boundaries, turbary, rights of way and maintenance of 
embankments and streams. These were all issues of
considerable importance, but definite proposals on any of 
them needed to be constructed by expert draftsmen. Had the 
committee attempted to consider these topics in any detail, 
its report would have been much delayed in its production and 
much longer in its content.
The first category of untenanted land to be dealt with 
was that of demesnes and home farms. These were the portions 
of estates farmed by landowners themselves, and they had 
always been specifically protected from any powers given to 
the CDB or the Estates Commissioners for the compulsory 
purchase of untenanted land. Under the 1903 act, the owners 
of large estates had, in order to obtain the 12% bonus on 
offer, to sell their entire estates and then repurchase their 
demesnes and home farms under the same terms as the tenant 
purchasers. This sale and re-purchase helped many landowners 
to clear the title to their land by using the bonus to pay 
their debtors. The report recommended that this situation 
continue unchanged, and, furthermore, that any new Irish
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Parliament was to be precluded for twenty years from
14legislating on such land. This ban was challenged by John
Fitzgibbon, chairman of Roscommon Co. Council, when the
report came before the convention, but his amendment was
defeated. In fact, brief consideration had been given, at
one stage, to a permanent ban on Irish government
interference with demesnes and home farms, but wiser counsels 
15had prevailed.
All untenanted land, other than demesnes and home farms, 
that lay within the congested districts would, on the 
appointed day, come under the control of the Board. It was 
felt that this was the only way to tackle effectively the 
problem of congestion and that every acre of untenanted land 
would be needed. This meant that with the exception of 
demesnes, home farms, and those tenanted holdings 
specifically excluded from the proposals, the landlord's 
interest in his entire estate would pass automatically to the 
CDB. Certain areas of the estate that were necessary for the 
proper working of the demesnes, such as herds' gardens or 
gamekeepers' cottages, could be excluded from the sale if 
agreement to that effect was reached between the landlord and 
the CDB.16
In the rest of the country, untenanted land was 
generally to be left undisturbed. When this matter was 
discussed by the committee it was argued that such a policy 
would be likely to be a source of continuing agitation in 
many parts, and that there existed a number of landlords who 
were anxious to sell their land if they could get ' a fair
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price.1 The counter argument was that large grass lands had 
a role to play in the economic life of the country and that
the purchase, re-distribution and sale of this land would be
17both very troublesome and very expensive.
This question caused much debate when the report came 
before the convention in January 1918. Fitzgibbon and Thomas 
Halligan, of Meath Co. Council, warned the delegates that 
unless some definite provision was made in the report for
landless' men, then agrarian agitation would continue and
18would, in fact, worsen. Lord McDonnell was aware of these 
criticisms, and when he presented the report, he stressed his 
belief that the needs of landless men were of lesser 
importance than the needs of the country as a whole and that 
the type of measure sought by Fitzgibbon was outside the 
terms of reference of the committee.
I have grave doubts whether consideration of the 
question of the purchase of the untenanted land 
throughout Ireland, and the destruction of the grazing 
interests really comes within the ambit of land 
purchase legislation. Land purchase was introduced to 
create a peasant proprietary ^ d  transfer ownership 
from the landlord to the tenant.
Fitzgibbon made another attempt to alter the
recommendations of the report when it came before the
convention again on 22 March. He proposed an amendment which 
would have enabled the Estates Commissioners to purchase 
untenanted land by compulsory means, for the purposes of 
relieving congestion on holdings already vested in tenants, 
for the improvement of uneconomic holdings, and for 
distribution among 'the sons of farmers.' He repeated his
claim that the grazing ranches were the source of much
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disorder and unrest in the country, and he pointed out to the
landowners that they were unlikely to get better terms from
an Irish Parliament than their counterparts within the area
of the CDB were then being given, Despite these impassioned
20pleas, the amendment was defeated by 35 votes to 27. 
McDonnell had been substantially correct in his assessment of 
the difficulties that would be involved in tackling this 
problem, but events would show that Fitzgibbon's warnings 
were in no way exaggerated.
The committee did recommend that the Estates 
Commissioners be given the power to purchase certain, 
strictly limited, categories of untenanted land within its 
area.
That the powers of the Estates Commissioners to 
acquire untenanted land by voluntary agreement with the 
owner should be extended to include the acquisition of 
such land (a) for resettlement in order to increase the 
food production of the country, and (b) on behalf of 
the Congested Districts Board, in connection, ^ ith the 
relief of congestion within the Board's area.
Where congestion existed on an estate that was located
outside the area of the CDB, the report recommended that the
Estates Commissioners be given the power of compulsory
purchase over as much of the untenanted land of the estate as
was necessary to relieve congestion on that particular 
22estate. Unlike the situation in the CDB, untenanted land
acquired in this manner could only be used for the relief of 
congestion on the estate in which it was situated.
The scope of the proposed legislation having been 
established, the report turned its attention towards the most 
complex of the problems awaiting its consideration; the
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financial basis of future sales. How to devise a measure 
that was acceptable to all parties in the transaction was a 
delicate problem that had never been definitively settled. 
Until 1903, the terms on offer were not sufficiently 
attractive to induce either the landlords or the tenants into 
a widespread transferral of ownership, and while the Wyndham 
act had, at its passing, seemed poised to complete land 
purchase, it was realised within a few years that doing so 
would be at an enormous cost to the state. Its replacement, 
or amendment, the 1909 act, solved this problem, but only by 
shifting the burden of loss to the landlords who were
unwilling or unable to shoulder it.
The committee considered a number of different
suggestions for a suitable compromise. One was that the 
landlords should be paid in cash provided by the government, 
with the tenants' annuities being fixed at 4.75%. Since the 
tenants' interest payments of 4.5% were below the market rate 
of 5%, this scheme resembled the 1903 act in that the
government was lending money cheaper than it could borrow it. 
As interest rates would rise, which seemed a distinct 
possibility at the time, then the loss to the government 
would rise in proportion. Another idea was that the
landlords should be given their purchase money half in cash 
and half in 3.25% stock, with the bonus being discarded. The 
advantages of this plan were that the purchasers' annuities 
would remain at 3.5%, while the vendors would have sufficient 
cash to pay their debtors without selling their stock at 
deflated prices. This option of payment in cash and stock
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had been offered, in return for priority treatment, to
landlords in pending cases in 1909, as it necessitated the
creation of less excess stock than was the case under the
original agreements. It was, nevertheless, considerably more
expensive than the standard terms offered in new cases in
1909, and it was very unlikely that the government would
23agree to its adoption.
The proposal that was recommended in the report was that 
payment should be made to the vendors in 5% land stock, with 
cash bonuses, and that the purchasers should pay annuities at 
5.25% of the price. 5% was the cheapest rate at which the 
government could borrow at the time, and, so long as that 
stayed the case, there would be no loss, excepting the 
payment of the bonus, to any of the parties in the 
transaction. If interest rates rose, then the 5% stock 
would, like the stock issued before it, tend to depreciate, 
and the landlords would have to suffer the loss if they tried 
to sell the stock they held, while raising the cash necessary 
for the bonus would become more expensive for the government. 
The sinking fund portion of the annuity was to be reduced to 
just 0.25%, but because of the high rate of interest of the 
stock, that would be enough to amortise the debt in 62 years. 
This period of repayment would remain fixed since the sinking 
fund payments were to be invested in 5% stock. This would be 
done by redeeming, as Sir Henry Doran had suggested, enough 
stock held by the vendors, and chosen by lot, to absorb each 
year's sinking fund payments. Since the vendors had the 
prospect of getting the full value of their stock in cash, it
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was hoped that this policy would help in minimising its 
depreciation.
In theory, the process of setting the purchase price of 
a holding and the amount of the annuity was a straightforward 
one. The purchaser's annuity would first be fixed at a 
certain level, usually at some percentage reduction of rent; 
this annuity would be used to calculate the purchase price, 
then the vendor's annual income, and finally the amount of 
bonus deemed necessary to bring this income to a sufficient 
level. If a tenant purchaser with a rental worth £100 per 
annum, was given a reduction of 21.3%, which was the average 
reduction given to the most numerous category of purchasers 
under the 1903 act, he would be left with an annuity of 
£78-14-0. Under the proposed scheme, £78-14-0 would be 5.25% 
of the purchase price for this holding. This would leave the 
purchase price at £1,499 or at, roughly, 15 years' purchase 
of the rent. The vendor would receive this amount in 5%
stock, yielding an annual interest payment of £75, or 75% of
25 .his former income. This of course did not include any
bonus, which could be used to boost the vendor's income. In
practice, of course, things worked in a circular manner. All
sides were well aware of how the system operated, and the
amount decided upon for the annuity was implicitly influenced
by the purchase price it would produce, and the bonus it
would involve.
At its first meeting the committee had immediately 
recognised one very important fact.
The basis of sale, as between landlord and tenant, 
must inevitably be conditioned by the fact that the 
purchaser's annuity must be less than his present
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Substantial reductions between rent and annuity had been 
the practice under previous legislation, and to have expected 
new tenant purchasers to have foregone this unofficial 
'bonus' would have been inviting unrest and agitation. This 
realisation was central to the committee's deliberations, 
though not, of course, to the point of seeing the landlords 
impoverished.
Under previous legislation, landlords and tenants 
settled the level of annuities themselves; subject to the 
approval of the CDB or the Estates Commissioners, who sought 
to minimise the differences between the prices set for 
similar holdings. This was a time-consuming method which, it 
was feared, would be unsuited to the situation that was about 
to arise. Many of the holdings remaining unsold by 1917 were 
in that position, precisely because agreement could not be
reached on a price. If the question of ownership was to be
taken out of the hands of landlords and tenants, then, 
logically, the next step was to do likewise with the question 
of price.
We are of opinion that the proposed automatic
transfer of all tenanted land on the appointed day 
necessitates the adoption of an automatic method, which 
is explained below, of fixing, first, the annuities 
payable by all tenant purchasers whose holdings are
vested in them without alteration by the Congested 
Districts Board or the Estates Commissioners,27and 
secondly, the purchase money of all tenanted land.
When the committee turned towards the problem of finding 
this suitable 'automatic method1, it was fortunate enough to 
have before it a solution that was immediately obvious and 
readily applicable, though, inevitably, not without some
62
qualifications. When the Land Court was set up as part of 
the Land Commission in 1881, it began straight away to fulfil 
its role as arbitrator in rent disputes between landlords and 
tenants, and, almost without exception, it gave the tenants 
significant reductions in their rents. The rents that it 
set, known as judicial rents, were legally binding on both 
sides and were to last for a minimum of 15 years. Thus, 
those set before 14 August 1896 were known as 'first term1 
rents, those between that date and 14 August 1911 as 'second 
term1 rents, and those set since the latter date as 'third 
term1 rents. Second and third term rents were those set 
within the respective dates, regardless of whether or not the 
Land Court had previously fixed a rent for that holding.
We are of opinion that, in the case of judicial 
rents, the best automatic basis is to fix the tenant 
purchaser's annuity at the same proportion of his 
existing rent as the annuities of previous teggnt 
purchasers of the same class formed of their rents.
The primary purpose of this recommendation was that each 
new tenant purchaser should pay, as close as possible, the 
same annuity that a neighbouring purchaser with a similar 
holding would have paid under the terms of the Wyndham act. 
To this end, calculations were to be made county by county 
rather than for the country as a whole. In fact, smaller 
areas, such as baronies or poor law unions, would have been 
used but for the difficulty in obtaining the appropriate 
tables of statistics and, more importantly, because average 
figures could only be fair to both sides if they were based 
on large numbers of transactions. It was for this reason, 
also, that it was with sales agreed under the 1903 act, and
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not the 1909 act, that comparisons were to be made.
Initially, the committee had felt that it would not be 
feasible to differentiate between the various categories of
judicial rent, or even between judicial and non-judicial
30rents. However, it was realised that such diverse rents
were not really comparable, and that the application of a 
single percentage reduction across the board would upset the 
delicate balance arrived at. To avoid this, four different 
'classes' of rent were to be used for determining purchase 
annuities. Tenants who were paying first term rents were to 
pay as annuities, proportions of rent that were similar to 
those paid by others who had had first term rents immediately 
prior to purchasing. These percentages ranged from 66.3 in 
Clare and Kerry to 74.5 in Kildare. While the number of 
tenants still paying first term rents was not thought to be 
very large, the same was not true of holders of second term 
rents who were believed to constitute the bulk of the 
unpurchased tenants. Here, the percentages payable averaged
78.7 over the country, varying from 74.5 in Cork and Clare to
3183.6 in Londonderry. Clare landlords had previously
managed better than most to avoid large reductions in rent, 
and had seen a relatively small amount of land sold to the 
tenants. As a consequence, the reductions from rent to
annuity, when they eventually took place there, would be
3 2generally greater than was usual elsewhere.
Complications arose when the cases of those tenants who 
held third term rents were considered. In the six years from 
1 April 1911, 14,682 tenants had had third term rents fixed
29
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for their holdings, receiving an average reduction from their 
old rents of 12.6%. Since very few of those tenants would, 
in the meantime, have had the opportunity of converting those 
rents into annuities, the only figures available with which 
to calculate the appropriate reductions upon purchasing were 
those used for second term rent holders. However, to have 
applied these percentage reductions to third term rents, 
would, on average, have left third term holders paying 
annuities of just 68.8% of their old pre 1911 rents. While 
it was accepted that the gains obtained by those tenants 
since 1911 could not be ignored completely, the committee 
felt that this reduction was excessive. After much
deliberation and calculation, a compromise was arrived at, 
whereby the tenant who held a third term rent would receive 
two-thirds of the percentage reduction that his neighbours 
with second term rents would receive from their rents, upon 
becoming purchasers. This would mean that such a tenant
would pay, on average, three-guarters of his pre 1911 rent as
33against 78.7% for second term rent holders.
This compromise proposal itself needed modification. 
The reductions given to third term rent holders by the Land 
Court had varied considerably, and many were well below the 
average mark of 12.6% considered by the committee. Thus, 
there was a real danger that not only would the advantages 
obtained by third term rent holders be ignored, but that they 
would be left worse off under the terms of this proposal than 
if their rent had not been revised since 1911. A Cork or 
Clare tenant who had received a reduction of less than 10.2%
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between his second and third term rents would be in just such 
a position. This, the committee rightly felt, would have 
been both unfair and unworkable.
The annuity to be paid by a tenant purchaser whose 
rent has been revised since 1911 should in no case be 
greater than that payable by a tenant purchaser whose 
rent had not been revised since 1911 (though it had 
been revised since 1896) and whose rent was equal to 
that payable before 1911 by a tenant purchaser who had 
obtained a subsequent revision. This provision will 
safeguard a purchaser, who has had his rent revised 
since 1911, from paying a larger annuity than he^ould 
have had to pay had his rent not been so revised.
This proviso was designed to ensure that no tenant 
purchaser would inadvertently be penalised for having had his 
rent fixed by the Land Court since 1911, and certainly those 
who had previously held second term rents couldn't lose. 
Their annuities were to be calculated by two different 
methods; firstly, under the proposals outlined for third term 
rent holders, and, secondly, as if they had simply kept their 
second term rents. Whichever of these methods produced the 
lowest annuity for a particular tenant was the one that would 
be used.
Not quite so clearcut, however, and not discussed by the 
committee, were the cases of third term rent holders whose 
previous rents had been first term rather, than second term. 
A Kerry tenant with a first term rent was entitled to a 33.7% 
reduction from rent to annuity, whereas a second term rent 
holder in the same county would receive only a 23.9% 
reduction, and it was on the basis of these second term 
reductions that calculations were to be made for the second 
method. Alternatively, under the proposals worked out for 
third term rent holders, such a tenant would need to have
6 6
received a reduction of 21.1% from his first to his third 
term rent, in order to achieve the final reduction of 33.7% 
that he would have got from his first term rent if he had 
never had it subsequently revised. As 21.1% was considerably 
above the average reduction of 12.6%, it was likely that, 
despite the best intentions of the committee, many tenants in 
Kerry, and elsewhere, would have been better off if they had 
not converted their first term rents to third term rents.
The fourth category of rent to be considered was that of
non-judicial rents. By offering timely and adequate
concessions to their tenants, some landlords had avoided
being brought to the Land Court altogether, which meant that
some other method of fixing annuities had to be found for the
holdings on their property. While tables for each county of
the percentage reductions granted to holders of non-judicial
rents upon becoming purchasers under the 1903 act were
available, the enormous variations in each county made it
impracticable for them to be used. Instead, the committee
recommended that the Land Court be instructed to fix, before
the appointed day, judicial rents for all holdings without
one, and that these judicial rents would subsequently be
treated as third term rents. Reductions in rent, previously
given by the landlord, were to be taken into account when the
rent was being fixed, and it was made quite clear that these
new rents were to be used only as a basis for calculating the
purchase annuity and that the tenant would continue to pay
35the old rent until the appointed day. At one point, it was 
suggested that the new judicial rent should not be made known
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until the appointed day 'to avoid friction1, but such secrecy 
would have been difficult to enforce and would, in all
probability, have created as many problems as it would have
3 6solved, and the idea was wisely dropped.
The only annuities left to be fixed were those of
holdings which had been enlarged, or in some way altered, by
the Estates Commissioners or the CDB. In a sense, these were
brand new holdings which therefore required new rents. Thus,
the tenants were to pay as annuities, 5.2 5% of whatever the
relevant authorities considered to be the fair prices for
3 7these new holdings.
Whatever the method used in fixing the annuity for a 
holding, and whatever the figure finally arrived at, the 
annuity, when fixed, would be equal to 5.25% of the purchase 
price of that holding, or, put another way, the purchase 
price was approximately nineteen times the annuity. This 
purchase price, which would vary from 12.6 years' rent for a 
first term rental in Clare or Kerry, to a possible 17 years' 
rent for a third term rental in Londonderry, was to be paid 
in 5% stock at face value. As there was a danger that such 
stock could be slightly depreciated, the committee 
recommended that all state charges, such as death duties or
quit rents, should be redeemable by the transfer of the
3 8appropriate amount of stock at face value. This was a
significantly watered down version of Sir Henry Doran's 
suggestion that all debts, whether state charges or bank 
mortgages, should be dealt with in this manner. This 
suggestion was considered by the committee, but was rejected
6 8
as being unlikely to get through parliament and as being
3 9unfair to the chargeants. These were rather weak excuses 
and it is worth remembering that the membership of the 
committee included a bank director and land agent, a 
solicitor, and a shopkeeper, which were all professions where 
it was not uncommon for some form of credit to be extended to 
the farming community.
In other respects, the committee was not without
sympathy for the landlords, and the income received from the
new automatic process of fixing the purchase price was
considered by it to be inadequate. Although it was realised
that a proportion of the landlord's rent income was generally
lost in the costs of collection and through bad debts,
proposed figures such as the 66.1% due to landlords in Kerry
and Clare of their old gross first term rents were 
4 0unacceptable. What exactly was to be done about this was 
not so easy to resolve.
When the report came before the convention in January 
1918, George Stewart proposed an amendment to the effect that 
the landlords be paid in 5% stock, not at face value, but at 
95%; which was the price at which 5% war bonds were being 
issued by the government at the time. This proposal would 
have given the landlords a slightly greater annual income and 
would have protected them, to a limited degree, from loss on 
the sale of their stock. As the tenants would have been 
unaffected by this proposal, Fitzgibbon supported the 
amendment, though for different reasons than Stewart. Since 
the proposals depended on the implementation of home rule, he
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was prepared to pay a high price, or, to be precise, to have 
the state pay a high price, to win the support of the
landlords. In making the point about everything being 
dependent on home rule, Fitzgibbon was, of course, merely 
repeating the point made in the report itself. Nonetheless, 
his comment struck a jarring note, and Lord McDonnell replied
curtly that be believed the landlords 'to be animated by
41higher principles than this.'
McDonnell argued strongly against the amendment as it
would have necessitated the creation by the state of excess 
stock to the extent of over £5 for every £100 created. This 
would have gone directly against one of the main principles 
of the proposals, and doubt was expressed as to whether it 
would be acceptable to the Treasury. Despite much debate, no 
agreement could be reached. Yet, many of the delegates were 
unwilling to see such a potentially divisive issue decided by 
a majority vote, and eventually the amendment was referred 
back to the committee with the following resolution.
That as the Convention is desirous of a compromise 
being arrived at on this matter, the amendment be
referred back to the Sub-Committee with the request
that an effort be made to find such a compromise as 
would place the landlords in a slightly better position 
than that givei^them in the report of the Land Purchase 
Sub-Committee.
A compromise was indeed arrived at by the committee, but 
only by approaching the matter from a different angle 
altogether. The stock was to be distributed at face value, 
but the landlords were to be put in a 'better position1 by 
increases in their bonuses. Doran's proposal that the bonus 
should be removed was never seriously entertained by the
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committee, but it was not so easy to agree on the appropriate
rate to be used. At the first meeting of the committee, it
was suggested that since the average rate of bonus given in
the 1909 act was 10% of the purchase price, a similar
proportion should be allowed for in future sales with the
4 3rates ranging from 8-12%.
Stewart objected to this and, instead, proposed that the
same scale be used as was used in the 1909 act, where the
rate of bonus received by the landlord was inversely
proportional to the number of years' purchase obtained. Use
of a 5.25% annuity, as opposed to a 3.5% annuity, gave a much
lower number of years' purchase, though not necessarily a
lower annual income, so that the application of the same
criteria in these different circumstances would have been
unrealistic. Since under the terms of the 1909 act, the top
rate of bonus was paid whenever the number of years' purchase
was less than 18, Stewart's suggestion would have meant that
in all future sales, where the number of years' purchase
would never rise above 17, the landlords would receive a
bonus of 18% of the purchase price. Apart from being very
expensive for the government, this proposal made no allowance
for the differences in the prices to be received by the
vendors; the same treatment was to be given to landlords with
first term rentals in Clare as to those with third term
rentals in Londonderry. Not surprisingly, the proposal was 
44dropped.
When the report was first presented to the convention, a 
new scale was introduced. The top rate of 18% would go only
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to those vendors who received 13.5 years' purchase, or less, 
for a holding, and the rate was reduced for every additional 
half year's purchase received. As no landlord would receive 
more than 17 years' purchase, the minimum rate of bonus that 
would apply was 4%. The effect of this scale was that 18% 
would be given to landlords with first term rentals in only 
18 counties, and to no vendors of second or third term 
holdings, while the minimum rate would be received by the 
landlords of third term holdings in 8 counties. The average
bonus would be 12%, which was the rate given across the board
4 5in the Wyndham act. This scale was unacceptable to the
three unionist members of the committee, who, in a 
reservation at the end of the report, declared themselves 
dissatisfied with the amounts received by the landlords under 
the proposals. As well as calling for the payment of stock 
at 95%, the reservation contained an alternative scale of 
bonus which would have allowed those receiving 14 years' 
purchase, or under, to claim the top rate of bonus, and which
would have generally increased by 2% the bonus payable to the
, 46vendor.
In fact, the compromise, which the committee was
instructed to find by the convention, involved the adoption
of a scale of bonus that was even more generous than that put
forward by the unionist members. Any vendor receiving fewer
than 14.5 years' purchase for a holding would be entitled to
a bonus of 18%, every vendor with over 14.5 years' purchase
would receive an additional 4%, the average bonus would be
47brought to 15%, and no landlord would now get less than 8%.
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All landlords with first term rentals would be on the top
rate of bonus, no matter where they were situated, and there
were 7 counties where vendors of second term holdings would
also qualify for the 18% bonus. In terms of pounds,
shillings and pence, this alteration in scale would have most
effect for those landlords with third term rentals in
Londonderry, who would receive an extra £3-8s annually,
while, on the other hand, those who had already been on the
48top rate of bonus derived no benefit from the change.
This automatic method of determining the purchase price
of a holding could not, of course, be applied to untenanted
land, as there were no annuities to fix. Within the area of
the CDB, where all untenanted land was to be acquired, the
Board, after inspecting a property, was to make an offer to
the owner, outlining it's estimate as to the annual value of
the land and the proposed purchase price. If this offer
proved unacceptable to the vendor then the matter was to be
decided by an appeal to the Judicial Commissioner of the Land
Commission, who would fix a price that was fair to both the
49owner and the CDB.
In the rest of the country, voluntary sales of 
untenanted land could take place if the owner could agree on 
a price with the Estates Commissioners, while in the limited 
number of new compulsory cases, the Judicial Commissioner 
would, in the absence of agreement between the vendor and the 
Estates Commissioners, again fix a price that was fair to 
both parties in the transaction. In his address to the 
convention on the presentation of the report, McDonnell paid
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special tribute to the three landlords' representatives, as
he termed them, for accepting this criterion of fairness to
both sides, rather than fixing the price at the market value.
The bonus payable to vendors of untenanted land would be on
the same scale as for tenanted land, with the number of
years' purchase being calculated by dividing the purchase
price by the annual value of the land to the vendor, as
. . 50estimated by the relevant authorities.
The report then stated firmly that the bonus should be
regarded as an Imperial obligation as it was completing a job
already begun by the Imperial government. The committee
roughly estimated the annual cost of the bonus to be 0.8% of
the amount to be advanced, which contrasted favourably with
the annual cost for bonus and excess stock of 1% for those
cases completed under the 1903 and 1909 acts, and with the
figure of 2.5% for pending cases. Such obvious economy, it
was hoped, would entice the government into accepting this
limited liability. Also to be accepted were the
administrative costs of the Land Commission and the CDB, as
far as the land purchase side of its operations was
concerned, as well as the non-recoverable costs of
improvements and of the settlement of untenanted land. On
the latter, the Estates Commissioners had lost just £360,000
between 1903 and 1917, less than 0.5% of the total advanced
during that period. These sums were to be paid out of Irish
funds, but were ultimately to be treated as part of Ireland's
51contribution to Imperial expenditure. Lloyd George's
comment about Irishmen having ‘ a knack of being wonderfully
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unanimous' on making demands from the Treasury had been more
52than just parliamentary humour.
The adoption of an automatic method of fixing the
annuity and purchase price of a holding, meant that the
discretionary powers held by the Estates Commissioners and
the CDB would be greatly reduced, so that the committee saw
no reason why either institution should remain a reserved
service. The Judicial Commissioner, however, who would be
entrusted with, among other things, the determining of the
purchase price of untenanted land, would remain an appointee
53of the Imperial government.
When the report was presented to the convention in
January 1918, Sir John Mahaffey, Provost of Trinity College,
moved an amendment which sought to ensure that the valuable
sporting and fishing rights in the country, previously held
by landlords, would not be destroyed by piecemeal
distribution to the tenants. Instead, he suggested that some
form of mechanism to establish collective ownership of these
rights be devised and enacted. The paragraph inserted by the
Committee, in lieu of the Provost's proposal, generally
supported these aims, but did so in language that was
uncharacteristically vague and ambiguous, and which would
55have been of little use to a parliamentary draftsman. When 
the report came before the convention again in March 1918, 
Thomas Lundon, of the Land and Labour Association, tried to 
have the sporting rights of previously untenanted land, which 
the report had clearly stated should be retained by the 
vendor, allocated to the new tenants, but his amendment was
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The final question to be considered by the committee was 
that of a perpetual rent charge. This idea, which had been 
mooted on occasions previously, involved the imposition of an 
annual rent to the state, in perpetuity, on all land which 
came under the operations of land purchase legislation. 
However, whatever its merits, it could not be applied 
retrospectively and so was dismissed by the committee. It 
was not prepared to place on those tenants yet to purchase,
an additional burden which their neighbours would remain free
„ 56 o f .
When the revised report came before the convention on 22 
March 1918, it faced just two amendments. After these had 
been dealt with, the motion to adopt the report as part of 
the findings of the convention was unanimously passed, one of 
only two clauses to be accepted in this manner. The report 
of the convention itself was presented to the government the 
following month, but was immediately forgotten in the 
conscription crisis which erupted at this time. Bishop 
O'Donnell of Raphoe had declared, at one stage, that the 
report of the sub-committee on land purchase in itself made 
the work of the convention worthwhile. In time, this remark
would prove to be more prophetic than the Bishop himself
57probably realised.
55r e j e c t e d .
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Land purchase, 1919-21:
The land policies of Dail Eireann
The purpose of the Irish convention was to agree on a
suitable framework for the government of Ireland, and
Lloyd-George had promised to adopt any proposals on which
1substantial agreement' could be reached. While the
convention had, of course, failed almost completely in this 
regard, it did manage to reach agreement on the action that 
was necessary for the completion of land purchase and the 
closing of a festering wound in Irish rural society. 
However, it was to be another two years before the government 
showed any real signs of taking such action.
There were a number of reasons why the delay was so 
great. 1918 was the year of the last great German offensive 
on the Western Front, of the Allied counter-offensive and the 
Armistice; 1919 saw the Versailles Conference and the return 
of thousands of ex-soldiers looking for work. In Ireland, 
these same years were marked by the conscription crisis, the 
spectacular triumph of Sinn Fein in the general election, the 
first sittings of the defiant Dail and the start of the War 
of Independence. Little wonder that land purchase was not 
exactly at the top of the cabinet's list of priorities! 
Furthermore, while it had pledged itself in advance to give 
legislative effect to any agreed solution worked out by the
CHAPTER THREE
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land purchase sub-committee, the government was absolved,
partially at least, from this responsibility by the terms of
the committee's report itself. The committee members had,
after all, explicitly stated at the top of the report that
their recommendations could be taken as agreed, if, and only
if, they were to form 'part of a large scheme for re-casting
2the framework of government in Ireland.' Such a scheme was 
attempted with the Government of Ireland act in 1920 and with 
this, a land bill was drawn up.
The 1920 land bill was, in its main provisions, a 
faithful copy of the report of the convention's land purchase 
sub-committee. Compulsory purchase of all untenanted land in 
congested districts and of all tenanted land in the country, 
the fixing of annuities and purchase prices on an automatic 
basis, and the terms offered to purchasers and vendors, were 
all as proposed at the convention. One additional measure, 
aimed at encouraging voluntary agreements, was the increase
of 1% on the bonus, if the compulsory purchase mechanism was
3 . . .avoided. This was hardly likely to affect significant
numbers, especially since the purchaser was not offered any
corresponding incentive to make haste; save possibly that of
priority treatment, and it is doubtful if many foresaw just
how valuable such priority could have been. Still, it seemed
as if the decision of Horace Plunkett to set up a land
purchase sub-committee was to be vindicated, and the efforts
of the committee members rewarded. But it was not to be.
Although the bill was given a second reading in the house of
lords, though not in the house of commoms, it never received
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the final sanction of the cabinet, and was allowed to lapse,
4leaving the issue of land purchase once more in abeyance.
A possible reason for this may lie in the conditions 
prevailing at the time. In the second half of 1920, large 
parts of the country were in a distinctly unsettled state, 
and in some areas the disturbances had at least as much to do 
with agrarian agitation as with the purely political 
struggle. In such a situation, it would have been impossible 
to implement any large scale plan for the completion of land 
purchase and it would have been foolish even to try. It 
would have been even greater folly to have passed a land act 
that was immediately and indefinitely postponed. The 
frustration of tenants, whose hopes would be raised and then 
dashed, combined with that of landless men who would realise 
that no legislation would fulfil their expectations, would 
have had fatal consequences; probably literally so for many 
landlords, land agents and graziers. Whether or not the 
government had these considerations in mind, its decision to 
drop land purchase was, at that moment, a wise one.
In its most recent incarnation, agrarian agitation had 
begun in 1918 in the south and west of the country. During 
the war, the government had imposed strict regulations 
requiring that a certain percentage of a holding or demesne 
be placed under tillage. Nevertheless, there still remained 
large, and sometimes very large, uncultivated grazing 
'ranches', which were to be found mostly in Clare, east 
Connaught, and north Leinster. While farmers were amply 
compensated for these irksome regulations by the high
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war-time prices that they received for their produce, these 
same high prices brought only hardship for those without 
land. J.J. Lee stated that from the turn of the century, 
use of the potato spray, 'the most effective prophylactic 
against social revolution in modern Ireland, took the potato 
out of politics.'6 Unfortunately, the spray was of little 
use on untilled soil, as a prophylactic against social 
revolution, potato blight, or anything else.
The combination of high food prices and vast areas of 
grazing land at their doorsteps, proved too much for many 
landless men, and very quickly, in the Spring of 1918, such 
land was simply taken over. The process usually began with 
the grazier's stock, generally cattle but sometimes sheep, 
been driven off the land. Sometimes they were driven on to 
another part of their owner's holding, but, on occasion, they 
were simply let loose on to the roads. The land thus cleared 
would then be fenced off and divided into suitable plots, 
ready for cultivation. At first, Sinn Fein and the 
Volunteers were strongly behind this movement, deciding in 
the words of one prominent young republican to cash in' on 
the unrest. Soon though, republican support cooled as they 
found themselves in opposition to many wealthy and
influential Sinn Fein supporters who had interests in
7 ■ •ranching. At any rate, effective action by the authorities
quelled the unrest and eased Sinn Fein out of its dilemma,
temporarily at least.
This was to be a pattern that was to be more or less
repeated over the next few years. This form of agitation was
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essentially seasonal in nature, beginning in December or 
January and building in intensity until May, when it tapered 
off again. It was intended to intimidate landowners and 
graziers and to disrupt the annual round of auctions and 
lettings of land under the eleven months system. The eleven 
months system, under which many ranches were held, was a well 
established means of evading the provisions of the various 
land acts and, according to such legislation, land leased in 
this way was still regarded as untenanted. Once the land had 
been leased out by the beginning of May and the tillage
season had started, the focus of the agitation was removed 
and a relative calm ensued.
Robert Barton was the first Dail's Director of
Agricultre, a term that was used for a while to denote
non-cabinet ministers, but after 1919, he spent much of his 
time in prison and a replacement was needed. Art O'Connor, a 
Kildare TD with a penchant for flamboyant rhetoric, was 
appointed Substitute Director of Agriculture. In 1921, 
O'Connor recalled how the 'land war' of 1920 had been 'no 
ordinary outbreak1, but how it had 'broke out with a
virulence and a presage of danger which made the worst of 
previous years seem positively tame.'
Only in the west, in Clare and parts of Kerry was 
the land war producing such a storm as would ultimately 
rouse the Dail from its lethargy like an angry mother 
to punish an unruly child. The majority of the people, 
though they drank deeply of the draught of freedom, 
kept their heads, but in the west they were hungry - 
hungry for land - and easily intoxicated with the wine 
which they drank to the dregs, they confused licence 
with liberty, they knew the British forces were 
powerless to restrain them, they hoped and perhaps 
thought that their own Government would condone a 
confiscation to right a confiscation of other days; 
that even if it objected, it too would be powerless to
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gtouch them till they had gained their ends.
Not only were the disturbances associated with this land
hunger more severe in 1920 than for a long time previously,
but they were also less discriminating in the objects of
their agitation. Small holdings as well as large ranches
were now subjected to assault and intimidation, as old
disputes were revived and scores settled. Most troublesome
of all were the claims of 'evicted tenants'. An evicted
tenant was anybody who had been evicted from a holding, or
more generally, had an ancestor who was once evicted, for any
reason whatsoever, whether justified or not. Some evicted
tenants, or their families, had indeed been arbitrarily
dispossessed in times when the powers of the landlord were
less circumscribed than they would be in later years, and
some of the 'genuine cases1 had remained landless, seeking
employment as labourers or herdsmen. These cases cast a
cloak of respectability over those evicted tenants who were
9themselves farmers, shopkeepers or otherwise well off.
Legislation to deal with genuine cases had been enacted 
in 1907, but had made little inroads into the problem. Since 
most of the holdings from which they had been evicted would 
eventually have been taken up by others, the claims of 
evicted tenants would obviously clash with the interests of 
the present incumbents, many of whom would, by then, have 
been paying purchase annuities. Eventually, the Dail was 
forced to take action, and on 29 June 192 0, a decree was 
passed disallowing all 'frivilous1 claims of evicted tenants 
to lands worked by their occupiers; though ranches were not
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to receive the same protection. Significantly, a clause that 
promised, once military victory had been achieved, 'to do 
justice and equity to all those who have suffered wrong in 
the past through the power and operation of England's unjust 
laws', was dropped at the suggestion of Arthur Griffith. 
From then until the end of the year, Dail Courts ruled out 43 
claims involving over 1,800 acres under this decree.10
Sinn Fein Arbitration Courts and Dail Courts have been 
dealt with by other historians, most notably by David 
Fitzpatrick in his Politics and Irish Life. 1913-1921. which 
analyses the social forces behind agrarian agitation, and is 
essential reading for anyone wishing to understand rural 
Ireland in this period. However, these courts did not form 
the entirety of the Dail' s attempt to cope with land hunger; 
which they regarded as potentially deadly to their cause. 
Much of the work undertaken by these courts was curative by 
nature but other, preventative efforts were also being made.
As early as 4 April 1919, Alex MacCabe proposed a motion 
pledging the Dail to a ' fair and full redistribution of the 
vacant lands and ranches of Ireland among the uneconomic 
holders and landless men.' Despite being seconded by 
Countess Markievicz, the motion was withdrawn, and a 
committee, headed by Barton, and including such figures as 
Lawrence Ginnell, Domhnall 0 Buachalla, Eamonn Duggan and Joe
McGrath, was set up to formulate an appropriate land
11 . policy. When this matter was discussed again on 18 June,
Joseph McBride suggested that an Agricultural Bank be set up
to help settle on the land the young men of the country.'
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The idea was accepted and Griffith moved a ministerial motion
to that effect.
The provision of land for the agricultural 
population now deprived thereof is decreed and a Loan 
Fund under the au^iority of Dail may be established to 
aid this purpose.
When the report of the Agriculture and Land Mortgage
Bank committees on the setting up of an Agricultural Loan
Bank came before the Dail on 2 0 August, a lively debate on
its proposals ensued. Some TDs felt that the Bank should be
allowed to advance the full purchase price, instead of
requiring a deposit of 25%, but others, such as Sean
Etchingham, who was a member of the committee set up the
previous April, pointed out that the Joint Stock Banks
advanced only 50% of the purchase money as well as demanding
collateral security. His criticism concerned the provision
of £200,000 as guarantee stock, which he considered to be
13inadequate. By 2 7 October, the arrangements for the Bank
had still not been finalised, and many of the TDs were
getting restless. There were warnings of graziers buying up
land and entrenching their positions. Daithi Ceannt
suggested that precedents should be set by dealing with the
most urgent cases, while Cathal Brugha urged that money
should be used for land purchase as it became available.
However, Duggan and Griffith, displaying a greater
understanding of mercantile operations, warned that the
entire project would be a failure if a substantial capital
14base was not in place before it began trading.
Eventually, by the end of 1919, Barton, who ironically 
would later in life head the Agricultural Credit Corporation
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for over 2 0 years, managed to set up the Land Bank, or the
National Land Bank as it was also known from that time, and
15operations began immediately. By 29 June 1920, the same
day that claims by evicted tenants were forbidden, Michael
Collins, acting in his capacity as Minister for Finance,
secured the permission of the Dail to spend £25,000 on
16establishing six branches of the bank in provincial areas.
As the bank was the creation of the Dail, it naturally
avoided contact with the Land Commission, which had, as its
head, the Judicial Commissioner; who was always a senior
member of the judiciary. Instead, it operated through local
co-operative societies which were formed for that purpose.
These societies purchased land from the owner, and the Land
Bank provided the mortgage. By the end of 1920, the bank had
advanced almost £180,000 for the purchase of 6,882 acres,
17with further commitments of £95,600 for over 4,000 acres. 
Impressive as these figures were in the circumstances, such 
success brought its own problems and O'Connor was rapidly 
learning the realities of land purchase finance.
It is clear that during the past year a very 
serious attempt was made by a large number of people to 
become owners of land on a cash basis. It is also 
clear that the Bank will not be able to continue 
financing intending purchasers at the present rate of 
application unless some drastic measures are taken to 
augment its resources or unless the acquisition of land 
is done through ^gJoint Stock Bank or ceases altogether 
on a cash basis.
O'Connor was bitterly critical of those who were quick 
to seek loans from the bank, but ignored it completely when 
making deposits. In spite of these difficulties, by August 
1921, the bank had financed the purchase of 15,750 acres by
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40 societies, and by the end of the year, the bank had nine
branches, five of them in Munster, over £400,000 in
subscribed capital, and net profits for the second half of
191921 of almost £5,000. However, such achievements were
sowing the seeds of future problems, mostly caused by the 
high prices paid by the societies in their eagerness to 
acquire land. In 1923, Ernest Blythe reflected that it was 
just as well that no more advances had been issued by the 
bank.
At that time, these people were willing to pay 
anything for land. The Land Bank was continually 
refusing to finance transactions because the people 
concerned were willing to pay a fa^Qgreater price than 
the Bank thought they ought to pay.
However, Blythe accepted that the bank had served a
valuable purpose at the time, and that, as the Dail's
creation, the Free State government had to accept
responsibility for it. Mortgages provided by the bank for
co-operative societies were to be repaid at 7% for seven
years, 6% for ten years, and 5% for thirteen years. These
rates were crippling for most societies, so the government
21made special provision for them in the 1923 land act. The 
Land Commission bought the land, paid off the mortgage, and 
resold the land to the society members at 4.75%. While it 
could thus be said that the Land Bank was nothing more than 
an ambitious experiment that ultimately proved unsuccessful, 
this should not detract from the vital role it played, from 
1919-21, in minimising agrarian unrest.
As the Land Bank was being established in 1919, a formal 
Dail land policy was also being worked out, and while no
8 6
comprehensive statement of the aims or proposed methods of 
the Land Acquisition Scheme, or Land Scheme, remains extant, 
its principles can easily be deduced from the various 
speeches of O'Connor.
Under the British Land Purchase Act the dominant 
idea was to fix the occupying tenant on the land. 
Under this scheme the dominant idea to fix the
non-occupyiny people on untenanted land.
Speaking to a conference in Co Galway, on 2 0 May 192 0,
which had been called to consider ways of calming the
agrarian unrest, O'Connor continued this speech by outlining
the categories of people who could expect to benefit from the
Dail land policy; namely, the uneconomic holders, the
landless and, most fanciful of all, 'the small tradesmen
living in a rural area, with knowledge of agricultural
operations, whose trade or business does not provide him with
23sufficient means for a decent livelihood.1 This was a
wildly unrealistic ambition which O'Connor never seriously 
attempted to fulfil, but the same rhetorical excesses were in 
evidence when he summed up the conclusions of a conference on 
2 9 May, attended by Western TDs, local Sinn Fein 
representatives and IRA Commandants, as well as by Cathal 
Brugha and Griffith.
The land question must be tackled by us not in any 
half-hearted dilettante manner, but with a desire to 
solve it where so many others have signally failed - - 
- and we should be worse than fools if we l^t the 
opportunity pass of righting the wrongs of ages.
This contrasts sharply with the sober, and even sombre, 
tone adopted when addressing the Dail a month later on 2 6 
June. He warned that then was not a good time for purchasing 
land as land values were unstable and, in many cases, grossly
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inflated. If the market in land slumped, then those with 
heavy interest charges would 'be very hard pressed if they do 
not go smash. 1 As the experience of the Land Bank and the 
co-operative societies would later prove, this was no idle 
warning. O'Connor's apparent disillusionment then reached a 
new level as he, almost wistfully, rebuked those who were 
hungry for immediate ownership for land; a highly dangerous 
step for anyone in public life to take.
If more people would be satisfied with the use of 
land under short term lease with purchase option at the 
end of say 15 years instead of madly craving for 
ownership at any cost the solution of the Land Problem 
would be easier a hundred fold and the financial safety 
of the new land holders would be more secure.
The key to reconciling the apparent contradictions in 
O'Connor's public utterances would appear to lie in 
considering his audience on any given occasion, and, by this 
time, the Dail was becoming very nervous about its lack of 
control over the agrarian unrest in the west. It was just 
three days later that it moved to quell this unrest.
O'Connor's doubts about the wisdom of energetically 
pursuing a policy of land purchase seem to have quickly 
disappeared, as in the Summer of 1920 he threw himself into 
the task of setting up the Land Settlement Commission. This 
was very much his own project, and it needed time to develop, 
so that for a while, Kevin O'Shiel, who had been appointed 
Special Commissioner and was the man responsible for 
translating policy into actual judgements, continued to
operate largely on the basis of common sense and his own
2 6legal training.
As the Land Settlement Commission became established
8 8
however, it gave increased credibility and legality to the
Dail's efforts. In the seven months from 1 May to 31
December 1921, it was calculated that claims involving almost
50,000 acres were dealt with by the courts and the
Commission, though this figure fell to 13,500 acres for the
27following six months. By August of 1921, O'Connor, in
submitting the estimates for the Commission, could list on 
its payroll, two full-time and one occasional Commissioner, a 
clerk, a typist, and a registrar who was in prison and so 
receiving just two-thirds of his salary. While it is not 
known how successfully the principle was applied in practice,
O'Connor's hope was that the Commission would co-ordinate its
2 8efforts in land distribution with those of the Land Bank.
One of the stated aims of the Dail's land policy was the
prevention of emigration, by providing landless men with
enough land to survive on. The prevention of emigration was
a recurring concern of the Dail in the period 1919-21, for
reasons that were simplistically outlined by Griffith in
August 1919. Fearing that the British government would
encourage emigration in order to reduce 'the preponderance of
young men' in the country, and thus weaken the power base of
29the IRA, the Dail was determined to meet the challenge.
Initially, the Land Bank and the Land Acquisition Scheme were
the chosen weapons in this particular battle, but gradually
the realisation grew that this preponderance of young men
could, in certain areas, pose a more serious threat to the
Dail than to the British government.
In Ireland we have the land which could at least 
support unemployed and save them from being a burden on
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the community and a menace to the State.
As the Dail's experience of the land problem grew, it 
came to realise that its attempts to deal with agrarian 
unrest were just as likely to explode in its face, as they 
were to win it popular support. While its policies could not 
be repudiated, the enthusiasm with which they were 
implemented noticeably waned, and by 1921, the focus of the 
Dail's efforts was being quietly switched, away from the 
settling of landless men on their own holdings, to assuaging 
their needs by providing them with employment on the farms of 
others.
This could only be done by an extension of tillage
farming, and O'Connor spent some time on deciding how best
this could be effected. In January 1921, he was still
hopeful that farmers could be encouraged to voluntarily
increase the amount of land being cultivated, with ‘the
equivalent of compulsion' being reserved for ranchers and for
31the unco-operative. By March, he had drafted a memorandum
on reducing unemployment, when he again appealed to the
'bulwark of the Nation' to save the Republic with their
ploughs. He also suggested a three point plan to pressurise
graziers, that entailed the use of 'moral suasion' from the
local community, a boycott of stock, and the withdrawal of
IRA protection from the ranch lands. Perhaps recognising the
lack of potency in these sanctions, O'Connor concluded,
cryptically, by claiming that, while his proposals would have
little immediate effect on rural unemployment, their
3 2'ultimate effect will be very good.'
30
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These proposals of O'Connor's were never followed 
through, as, by this time, the IRA was fighting for its 
survival, but probably also because they were simply 
unenforceable. They were, like the rest of the Dail's 
efforts to deal with the land problem, well-intentioned and 
not without merit, but wholly unegual to the task. Given the 
scale of the problem, the precariousness of the Dail's 
existence, and the lack of resources at its disposal, this 
was neither surprising nor a source of criticism to those 
involved. At the beginning of 1922, O'Connor, who had been 
appointed Minister for Agriculture the previous September, 
was to be replaced by Patrick Hogan, as the Provisional 
government came into existence, and a new phase in the 
history of land purchase was about to begin.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Transfer and takeover:
The administration of land purchase in the Free State
In January of 1922, Patrick Hogan was appointed Minister 
for Agriculture in both the Dail Ministry and the Provisional 
Government. At the time, he was just thirty one years of age 
and had only been a TD since the previous Summer. Born in 
Co. Clare, he had been a member of the Volunteers before 
being elected to the Dail for the Galway constituency. A 
solicitor by profession, it is perhaps not surprising that 
Hogan would direct his energies to adopting to his own needs 
the imposing structure of the land purchase code, rather than 
attempting to utilise the ad hoc measures improvised by the 
Dail over the previous three years.1
By signing the Treaty, the Irish plenipotentiaries had 
implicitly accepted the legitimacy of the 1920 Government of 
Ireland act, as it was the parliament of "Southern Ireland',
as established by that act, and not the Dail, that was given
2formal recognition in the terms of the Treaty. While the 
majority of the issues connected with land purchase had been 
left to the abortive land bill of the same year, the 
responsibility for the collection of annuities was allocated 
to the two governments on the island for their respective 
areas; along the principles laid down by the land purchase 
sub-committee of the Irish convention. However, in a radical
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departure from the convention proposals, these annuities were 
to be retained by the respective exchequers, while the loss 
to the Irish Land Purchase Fund would be made good from 
Westminster. These annuities were not to be recovered by 
the British through the complex system of taxation that was 
devised, as one historian has suggested, though the Irish 
governments were to be charged with the smaller, though still 
considerable, costs for excess stock and bonus, 
administration, and the collection of annuities. The 
relevant figures for 1920-21 for the Southern government 
were, a revenue from annuities of £2,649,000 and an 
expenditure of £1,062,300. The net figures would have left a
surplus on land purchase transactions to the Southern
4government of over £1.5 million.
It is probable that Lloyd George made this offer as part 
of an attempt to treat Ireland fairly and even generously; or 
at least to be seen to do so. As he must have realised, the 
constitutional positions of the new governments were unlikely 
to win much favour among republican circles, and it is 
possible that he tried to win the support of moderates by 
making financial concessions. It is worth remembering that 
debate over fiscal matters at the time of the third home rule 
bill, and during the meetings of the Irish convention, had 
been almost as intense as the debates on partition and on the 
status of any Irish government. Retention of the annuities 
by the two Irish governments would be particularly well 
suited to this purpose. The British would be able to help 
the new governments without the politically dangerous
93
expedient of providing direct aid; though, of course, they 
would be sustaining a considerable annual loss on the payment 
of interest to stockholders. Similarly, the Irish
governments would be saved the embarrssment of making large 
annual payments, collected from the farming community, to 
Britain. The annuities were, of course, terminable, so that 
the indirect assisstance provided by the British, would 
gradually decrease, before quietly ceasing altogether.
This was a once-off offer which was not repeated, though
the Stormont government took their opportunity and, from then
5on, kept the annuities. However, the Government of Ireland 
act had passed into law, even if it never came into force in 
the 26 counties, and the legal position regarding the 
annuities was very unclear. Inexplicably, this powerful 
bargaining position was to be ignored by all Free State 
governments, until the accession to power of de Valera. In 
fact, at one stage, Hogan admitted the young Free State's 
'undoubted' liability for the payment of the annuities to 
Britain, and he promised Cosgrave that he would draft a 
memorandum on the subject. This memorandum, if it ever 
existed, would probably have explained the government's 
attitude on the issue, but, despite an extensive search 
ordered by de Valera in 1932, it could not be found.^
When the Treaty was signed in December 1921, it 
contained no reference to land purchase; either to annuities 
or to future sales. This omission was rectified the 
following month when the 'Heads of working arrangements for 
implementing the Treaty1 were agreed on 24 January. Despite
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the provisions of the 1920 act, Article 42 of this document
stipulated that, pending a definite arrangement for
capitalisation, the Provisional government was to be
responsible for the collection of annuities and their payment
7to the British exchequer. The British government
regularised this arrangement, at least as far as it was 
concerned, with the 'Government of Ireland, Transfer of 
Functions Order1, in April 1922. However, the wording of one 
clause in particular was a source of contention.
[The Provisional Government shall pay into the 
Irish Land Purchase Fund] such sums as may after the 
day of transfer be required to discharge the 
liabilities of those funds and accounts in respect of 
interest on stock or advances issued or made in 
connection with land purchase in Southern Ireland and 
to meet the corresponding sinking fund charges.
This passage suggested that the Provisional government 
was to be held responsible for the payments due on excess 
stock and bonus, which, of course, were not covered by the 
purchasers' annuities. This interpretation was confirmed at 
a conference held in London on 9 November 1922, between the
British committee on Irish affairs and a very high powered
Irish delegation, which included Cosgrave, Hogan, and Kevin 
O'Higgins, as well as number of senior officials. Both
governments denied liability for excess stock, and they 
agreed to leave the question over to the ultimate financial 
settlement that was provided for under the Treaty. Of
course, payments had to be made in the meantime, and neither 
government was prepared to provide the necessary cash, even 
without any concession in principle. Despite the Irish 
delegation's argument that the British would be better able
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to bear the strain on their resources, the question was
9adjourned without agreement.
The issue of excess stock and bonus was closely linked, 
as Hogan realised, with that of pending sales, which, on 1 
November 1922, involved over £6.25 million.'1"0 The previous 
March, Kevin O'Higgins had been informed in London that the 
British exchequer would continue to provide funds to complete 
pending sales 'until the transfer of these services take 
place. 1 This last phrase, with its implication that such 
funds would no longer be available after the transfer date, 
caused consternation in the Cabinet, and Hogan was
immediately dispatched to get in touch with O'Higgins to have
. . 11 the situation clarified.
By December, the question had still not been finally 
resolved, nor had the Executive Council drawn up a firm 
negotiating policy, despite being urged to do so by Hogan, 
who as an 'extern' minister of the Free State, was not a
member of the Executive Council. In a detailed memorandum, 
he set out the issues involved, calculating that, for the 26
counties, finance for £3.9 million in cash sales, as well as
£1.4 million in stock sales, would be needed to complete 
pending sales. This would result in annual payments of 
£120,000 on excess stock and bonus becoming necessary. Both 
tenants and landlords were entitled to demand that these 
sales go ahead on the terms originally agreed, as to alter 
them in favour of the state would necessarily leave one or 
both of the parties worse off. The British government were 
committed to seeing these sales completed, so that the
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crucial question, as Hogan saw it, was whether this 
responsibility could be transferred to the Free State 
government. If it could, then logically so too could the 
liability for the excess stock and bonus payments due on 
sales already completed. As these payments totalled over £1 
million annually, the matter was one of very considerable 
importance.12
Hogan argued that the situation was serious enough to 
warrant the suspension of negotiations with the British 
government until the Free State had adopted a definite stand 
on the issue. This would not have resulted in any slowing 
down in the work of the Land Commission or the CDB where, 
after all, most of the pending sales had already been waiting 
to be completed for up to fifteen years. There was enough 
work to fully occupy the staff for several months, so that 
the government would not have had to publicly admit that land 
purchase had ceased temporarily. In any case, much to 
Hogan's surprise, the British Treasury had continued to 
advance stock after the Free State had come into existence, 
despite the failure to settle the question of liability. 
Cosgrave was unswayed by these arguments and, in notes made 
on the margins of this document, expressed the opinion that
it was in the best interests of the government to press for a
13speedy resolution of the issue.
On 10 January 1923, the British government outlined 
their position in a letter that was sent from the Colonial 
office to the Free State government. The British were
willing to provide the necessary stock and cash to complete
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pending sales, and to assist the Free State in financing a 
new land purchase scheme, subject to a number of conditions. 
The Free State government was to accept liability for all 
administrative costs of land purchase, and for bonus and 
excess stock payments that would be due on both existing and 
pending agreements. All payments made by the British in this 
regard since 1 April 1922 were to be refunded. The Free 
State government was to guarantee all payments by providing 
Britain with ' a first charge on a specific portion of their 
revenues, e.g. Customs.' Any new scheme of land purchase was 
to be subject to the approval of the British governmet, who, 
if they were satisfied with its terms, would guarantee the 
stock that would be issued by the Free State government. 
These proposals would have left the British holding tight 
guarantees on all the liabilities of the Free State 
government, without any cost to itself, and this letter was 
simply their opening position for the negotiations that would 
follow.14
Eventually, the issue was resolved at a conference
attended by Cosgrave and Hogan on 12 February 1923, with the
signing of the 'Financial agreements between the Irish Free
15 .State government and the British government.1 The British 
undertook to provide the cash and stock that was necessary to 
complete pending sales, and they also accepted, almost 
completely, liability for the payments due each year on 
excess stock and bonus for both pending and completed sales. 
However, this was no 'free gift to Ireland1. In return, the 
Free State agreed: to collect and hand over to the Treasury,
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the full amount of annuities due: to provide a local
guarantee fund, as in previous legislation, as security for 
these payments :to provide the central fund as the ultimate 
guarantee of payment: to accept responsibility for the
administrative costs of the Land Commission: and to make an
annual contribution in respect of excess stock and bonus of 
£160,000.16
This latter payment could be viewed as being in keeping
with the proposals made at the Irish convention in 1918,
which suggested that the cost of excess stock and bonus was
to be treated as Imperial expenditure to which the Irish
government would make an appropriate contribution. However,
the convention had also proposed that the administrative
costs of land purchase be similarly treated. Balancing this
was the fact that control of the Land Commission and the CDB
was to be transferred, without reserve, to the Free State
government; although the agreement to complete pending sales
without alteration removed one of the main functions that the
17convention had proposed should be reserved.
Of course, problems surronding excess stock and pending
sales were not the only issues relating to land purchase that
had to be resolved, and, running parallel to these
negotiations, were discussions on the completion of land
purchase. Initially, when the arrangements for implementing
the terms of the Treaty were being worked out in January
1922, Michael Collins, as the Irish negotiator, requested
18that the issue of future sales be temporarily left aside.
It was taken up again at the November meeting, when the Irish
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delegates suggested that the British government might be
willing to provide credit for any new measure, but no
19agreement was reached. The proposals made by the British
in January 1923 regarding future sales were broadly accepted
by the Free State government, and were written into the
financial agreement signed in February.
The terms of any new scheme which the Free State 
Government may propose to enact after such consultation 
with landlords and tenants as they may think necessary 
shall be subject to the concurrence of the British 
Govern^ignt in consideration of the guarantee mentioned 
below.
The Free State was to provide the necessary finance, by 
the issue of Irish stock which the British agreed to 
guarantee, subject to approving the terms of the legislation. 
While the annuities accruing from any new scheme would be 
retained by the Free State government, the interest and
sinking fund payments due on the stock were still to be
secured in the same manner as under previous acts. Thus, the 
British government would only have been called upon to honour
their guarantee in the event of the Free State government
21being bankrupted, or the stock being repudiated.
It is not surprising that there should be little 
similarity between these arrangements and the proposed 
allocation of responsibility for future legislation proposed 
by the convention. In the light of the political changes 
that had taken place since 1918, it would have been
unrealistic to have expected the British Treasury to have 
issued the necessary stock, and to have treated any bonus as 
Imperial expenditure. Against this was the fact that the
Judicial Commissioner of the Land Commission was to be
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appointed from Dublin instead of from Westminster, as had
2 2been proposed by the convention. Hogan was aware of this 
proposal and had been worried that the British would attempt 
to have it included in the new arrangements. He warned the 
Executive Council that such a move would be completely 
unacceptable. Instead, the Free State could provide security 
for any credit guarantee given by the British, as well as 
allowing them to see the legislation before agreeing to
guarantee the stock. These were precisely the arrangements
23that were accepted by both sides.
The financial agreement was to have serious long-term
repercussions in the Free State. Kept secret by both
governments, it was not until Fianna Fail came to power and
the dispute over the payment of the land annuities arose,
that the British government suddenly produced their copy of
the document and it passed into the public domain. That it
was kept a secret was due to the clause allowing the British
government prior approval of the forthcoming land bill.
Ronan Fanning, in his account of the Department of Finance,
speculated that 'the political sensitivities' of the
government were not immediately alive to the dangers inherent
in this proposal, and that the initial impetus for secrecy
came from the British Treasury in their 'anxiety to save the
Irish government from political and financial embarrassment
2 4on the eve of the 1923 election1. In fact, secrecy had
become an issue much earlier than this, due to the actions of 
Hogan. When he met representatives of landlords and tenants 
at a conference in April 1923, the tenants wanted to know the
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reason for the generosity of the British government in 
guaranteeing the stock and inquired as to the price at which 
such generosity came.
I stated that the British Government had agreed to 
guarantee the stock without any securities or 
conditions good, bad, or indifferent, and that they 
might draw whatever conclusions they liked from that, 
but that that was the fact.
The reason for this statement, as explained privately to 
Cosgrave, was that if it became public knowledge that stock
created under any future land purchase legislation would be
guaranteed by Britain only if it had prior approval of the 
legislation, it would prove impossible to counter-act the 
belief that 'the terms of the land bill were to be virtually 
settled in England.1 Whatever the expediencies of the
situation, Hogan had deliberately misled the tenants1 
representatives and he realised that his career would be in 
jeopardy if this were to be discovered. He calmly informed 
Cosgrave that it would be necessary to keep the relevant part 
of the financial agreement 'strictly secret1. In fact, he 
was prepared to go even further than this.
The Dail could be told, when it is necessary to 
tell them anything about this, that the British
Government have agreed that if they do guarantee the 
stock they will guarantee it without any security, such 
as a lien on customs, and that of course they could not 
be expected to give a final promise until they would 
see what they were guaranteeing and know the amount 
involved.
It didn't actually become necessary to tell the Dail 
anything about this until two years had passed, when the Land 
Bond Bill was being debated. Then, Thomas Johnson pressed 
Hogan with claims that a secret arrangement had been entered 
into, at the time of the Treaty negotiations, to the effect
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that land purchase would be completed with British credit; 
which is precisely what had taken place. At first, Hogan had 
side-stepped the question, before giving what was an 
apparently unequivocal denial.
There is no question, x>f an agreement in the past, 
or in 1920, 1921 or 1922.
Of course, the financial agreement had been signed in
1923, and not in 1920, 1921 or 1922, but it had been signed
'in the past'. This subtlety was in evidence again, minutes
later, when he spoke of the guarantee being offered by the
British government on a voluntary basis. At the time, he was
equating the guarantee of the stock to be issued under the
Free State 1923 land act, with the advances made for land
purchase by the British under previous measures passed in
Westminster. These advances had been made under very
different conditions from those which prevailed in 1923 and
afterwards, but Hogan glossed over the differences in this
particular instance so that, while the words used may not
have contained any direct falsehoods, the impression that his
2 8listeners were left with was deliberately misleading.
What Hogan was trying to avoid was the spread of the 
belief that the British government would have a veto over any 
Free State land purchase legislation. This was one possible 
interpretation of the wording of the financial agreement, and 
there is little doubt that had the document been published, 
or produced in the Dail, then it would have been used by the 
government's many enemies in the country to enormously 
damaging effect. However, Hogan viewed matters differently. 
Privately, he outlined his own interpretations to Cosgrave.
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The position is that the English can either 
guarantee the stock or not guarantee it. If they do 
guarantee it they guarantee it without any security.
If they do not guarantee it we will pimply have to 
issue the stock without their security.
By security', Hogan meant collateral in terms of
property, territory or the right to appropriate any form of 
taxation, such as had been originally sought by the British 
in regard to customs revenue, rather than the "security1 of a 
local guarantee fund or, ultimately, of the central fund of 
the Free State, as written into the agreement. His attitude 
was that the new land bill would be drawn up in Dublin and 
then presented to the British on a "take it or leave it'
basis. This interpretation would certainly have been more
consistent with his statements to the tenants' 
representatives and to the Dail. Even so, it would still 
have been very difficult to justify the claims that no 
agreement had been signed, or that there were absolutely no 
conditions attached to the British guarantee of the stock. 
In any event, Hogan formally presented the Duke of
Devonshire, Secretary of State for the Colonies, with a 
summary of the main proposals contained in the new land bill 
in May 1923, a fortnight before its first reading in the 
Dail, while Judge Wylie, the new Judicial Commissioner of the 
Land Commission, had also discussed the bill with British 
officials.30
There was a somewhat farcical sequel to the negotiations 
on the financial agreement, arising directly from the secrecy 
in which they were shrouded. The Land Commission continued 
until August 1923 to sign new purchase agreements under the
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terms of the 1909 act, which, for the first half of 1923, was 
still in force. The government was unable to prevent these 
sale taking place as it could not disclose the terms of the 
agreement nor could they suspend land purchase without 
serious political consequences and possibly a resurgence of 
agitation. In December 1923, the Free State sought to have 
the British accept responsibility for these agreements, on 
the grounds that they were completed using 3% stock and under 
legislation that had been enacted at Westminster. Not 
surprisingly, the British rejected these arguments 
completely, and it was not until M y 1924 that agreement was 
reached. The British would provide the necessary stock but 
the Free State would provide the money for the cash bonuses, 
worth almost £20,000, and would pay over the annuities as 
with sales previously completed. Since the vendors were paid 
in stock, there was no excess stock involved and the 
transactions were completely painless for the British 
government.31
This was but one of a number of administrative problems 
that arose during the transfer of the Land Commission. This 
transfer had been delayed until the dispute over the 
liabilities for pending sales and excess stock was settled 
and, during 1922, administrative control of the Land 
Commission remained with the British authorities, who 
continued to run it as an all-Ireland service. This caused 
some friction, initially, and in February 1922, the 
Provisional government, in keeping with their general policy 
towards the North, decided that the Belfast parliament was
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'to be hampered in every possible way1 in the collection of
purchase annuities. After the second conference between
32Collins and Craig in March, such references peter out.
In July of that year, occurred an incident that was to
have long-term consequences for the smooth operation of land
purchase. Lost in the fire that destroyed the Four Courts
were, amongst other Land Commission and CDB documents, 10,000
land purchase agreements, 3,000 estate maps and 1,000 land
certificates, as well as title deeds and the notebooks of the
examiners of title. Such destruction was inevitably going to
be the cause of much delay in the completion of land 
33purchase.
The method of transfer adopted was that the Irish Land
Commission was to be formally abolished by the Consequential
Provisions Act, 1922. This would take effect on 1 April,
1923, when it would be replaced by a similar body to be set
up by the Free State. However, as this deadline approached,
the British could see no sign of the Free State government
fulfilling this requirement and they expressed their
unwillingness to provide finance for pending sales until the
Land Commission was replaced by another body, even if it was
34only a temporary arrangement. This was what the Free State
government had already decided to do, as explained by Hugh
Kennedy, the Attorney General, to his British counterpart. A
Board of Commissioners was set up under the Adoption of
Enactments Act, 1922, to take over the functions of the Land
Commission 'pending legislation on the subject, which of
35course can hardly be ready for some time.'
1 0 6
Nevertheless, on 10 March, the Treasury were still 
waiting to be officially informed that the Land Commission 
had been properly replaced, and, consequently, refused to 
issue any advances. Even when they received proper
notification, the Treasury still viewed the new arrangement 
with caution, and only grudgingly agreed to issue stock. 
Requisitions were to be made using the appropriate form and 
had to be signed by any two of three specially authorised 
officials: Judge Wylie, John Drennan and J.J. Douglas, who
were the Judicial Commissioner, Assistant Secretary and 
Accountant, respectively, of the Land Commission. A limit on 
advances to be made in this manner was set at £100,000, but 
after much correspondence between the Department of Finance 
and the Treasury, and some confusion over the correct form to 
be used, caused by a breakdown in communications between the
Land Commission and the Department of Agriculture, this limit
3 6was extended; first to £200,000, and finally to £250,000.
The reason for the government's delay in providing a
proper statutory basis for the Land Commission was that it
had never intended to merely reaffirm the existing structure
of land purchase administration. In November 1922, Hogan had
informed the Dail that he believed that there was need for
only one body to organise land purchase, though he emphasised
37that no definite decisions had, at the time, been taken.
By May 1923, definite decisions had been taken and the fruits 
of these decisions were seen in the provisions of the Land 
Law (Commission) Bill, 1923, introduced to the Dail on 11 
May. The main aim of the bill was the abolition of the CDB
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and the Estates Commissioners as separate institutions, and 
the transfer of their powers, duties, property and staff into 
a single, re-constituted Land Commission. On the second 
reading, Hogan explained the logic behind the bill.
The Lay Land Commissioners administered the Land 
Law Acts; the Estates Commissioners, who were the same 
persons, administered the Land Purchase Acts. We have 
come to the conclusion that there is no further reason 
for this sort of Pooh Bah arrangement, and this Bill 
really abolishes^ the two titles. The personnel was 
always the same.
The same standard of rationalisation was applied in the 
case of the CDB, and not a single objection was raised to the 
principle of the bill by TDs, who recognised that a more 
simplified structure increased the chances of land purchase 
running quickly and efficiently in the future. The CDB 
possessed certain responsibilities for fishing and local 
industry, and these were to be re-transferred from the Land 
Commission to the appropriate ministries. Hogan informed the 
Dail that this circuitous way of doing business had to be 
adopted so that there was a properly constituted body to whom
the British Treasury could issue advances for the completion
3 9of pending sales. In fact, it was on the previous day, 29 
May, that the Treasury had informed the Department of Finance 
of their willingness to advance stock to the existing 
temporary administration of the Land Commission, but it was 
possible that Hogan was not yet aware of this. The only 
clauses of the bill that caused any contention had nothing to 
do with land purchase or land law, but with the method that 
was to be used in grading the staff of the CDB into the Civil 
Service upon their transfer to the Land Commission.
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The incorporation of the Estates Commissioners and the
CDB into the Land Commission was not the only merger of land
purchase organisations to take place in 1923. The Land
Settlement Commission was still in existence and it was
considered necessary that it should be absorbed in to the new
structure, even though concern for its fate was expressed by
40only one TD during the debate on the Land Commission bill.
In December 1923, it was quietly discontinued and its staff 
were transferred to the Land Commission with the minimum of 
fuss.4  ^ It was a far cry from the confident and almost 
triumphant manner in which it had been launched just a little 
over three years previously.
Earlier in 1923, it had seemed, for a brief period, as 
if the legacy of the Land Settlement Commission would be a 
situation of legal chaos, coupled with a fresh outbreak of 
bitter land disputes. When one of its decisions, in Rineen 
Co. Clare, was overturned in the King's Bench Division, it 
was feared that all its judgements were now legally 
vulnerable. Kevin O'Shiel, who was a Commissioner in that 
case and who, by 1923, was acting as Assistant Legal Adviser 
to the government, warned that up to 400 cases adjudicated on 
by the Land Settlement Commission could be dragged before the 
courts again by those who felt aggrieved by the original 
decision. However, Kevin O'Higgins assured the Dail that 
practically all the decrees of the Commission had since been
covered by assignments, i.e. legal orders, and were legally
42secure from challenge.
With Judge Wylie having been appointed Judicial
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Commissioner in March 1923, all that remained in the 
reorganisation of the Land Commission was the appointment of 
two Lay Commissioners. On 13 November 1923, Hogan
recommended to the Executive Council, the appointment of 
Timothy Hogan, then Chief Inspector of the Land Commission, 
and Martin Heavey, Head of the Land Settlement Commission, 
while the candidacy of 0 1 Shiel was also mentioned. The 
matter was twice deferred until, on 19 November, Hogan and 
O'Shiel were appointed to the positions which carried annual 
salaries of £1,300-1,500 plus bonuses. These were the men 
who were to have the responsibility of carrying out one of
the most demanding tasks ever charged on the Land Commission;
4 3the implementation of the 1923 land act.
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CHAPTER PIVE
The 1923 land act
The Provisional government was not long in existence
when it was faced with renewed calls from the Dail for the
completion of land purchase. When the British army was
evacuating the lands it had held, which in some cases were
quite extensive, Daithi Ceannt proposed that these lands be
divided up into holdings for the landless men of those
districts. In reply, Hogan made it clear that the piecemeal
methods which had been adopted from necessity by the Land
Settlement Commission were no longer sufficient. If land
purchase was to proceed, it had to do so on the basis of a
comprehensive scheme that was economically viable. And
therein lay the rubl It was hardly likely that a state not
yet formally in existence would be able to borrow or raise at
1reasonable rates the money necessary for land purchase.
This argument was repeatedly brought forward during 1922 
to explain the government's apparent inactivity on the issue. 
Unbeknownst to the Dail, the government had, on a number of 
occasions, postponed dealing with land purchase, though the
lack of government credit was not the only, nor primary,
2 . . . . .  reason for the delay. Until the question of the liabilities
for the existing purchase annuities and for the pending sales
was cleared up, the introduction of any scheme of land
purchase would have been impossible. Surprisingly, this was
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a point that was regularly emphasised by the Unpurchased 
Tenants Association in the columns of their newspaper
The Land, which appeared briefly in the Summer of 1923. 
Although the financial agreement had already been signed some 
months at this stage, this was not, of course, known 
publicly, and The Land was adamant that the government should 
not continue with land purchase until the financial
settlement, provided for in Article 5 of the Treaty, was 
agreed with the British. In the meantime, the unpurchased 
tenants would, it argued, be content with generous reductions 
in their rent.
It was unanimously decided that the settlement of 
the land question is an economic matter and must not be 
rushed on the country; that the present financial and 
economic position of Ireland does not warrant the 
introduction at the present ^ime of any scheme
involving large financial burden.
There was a third reason for postponing the introduction 
of a new land bill, and even had this reason stood on its 
own, it would have provided sufficient grounds for delay. 
Once civil war had started there was no chance that the
government could act on this matter as, asides from being 
understandably preoccupied with the military struggle, any 
attempt to have completed land purchase would inevitably have 
left some people disaffected and would probably have 
increased support for the irregulars. By December 1922, 
there was evidence that the irregulars were provoking a fresh 
outbreak of agrarian agitation in parts of the country, while 
in others, the civil war was used as a pretext for renewing 
private land battles. As in previous years, it was difficult 
to say who was using whom, but Hogan himself had little
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doubt.
I have noted the cases through the country where 
houses have been burned and in more than fifty per cent 
of these cases the circumstances make it plain enough 
that the destruction was not for political but for 
agrarian motives.
The situation that faced the government at the end of 
1922, as regards the land question, was not entirely 
dissimilar to the one with which the British government had 
had to deal in 1920. However, the young Free State 
government was determined that its attempts to solve the land 
problem would not meet with the same fate as had the 1920 
land bill, and in the Governor General's address to the 
Oireachtas on 10 December 1922, a land purchase bill was
5included in the legislative programme of the new government. 
Initially, Hogan hoped to have the bill introduced into the 
house by March of 1923, but this proved to be over- 
optimistic, as the condition of the country at that time was 
not nearly settled enough to receive it.6 As late as 2 3 
April, Hogan was still warning the Executive Council that he 
had reliable intelligence that there would soon be a fresh
7'campaign of incendiarism.' Earlier that month, he had 
detailed to Cosgrave the spate of land seizures, cattle 
drives and house burnings then plaguing the country. There 
was one other circumstance, which he referred to, that 
rendered the hoped-for completion of land purchase 
particularly difficult.
The shooting of Land Commission officials would be 
not a rare but rather a norm^L occurrence and would be 
regarded as quite legitimate.
However, there were some factors that were working in
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the government's favour. The civil war was coming to an end,
which meant that it was becoming increasingly possible for
the military to switch their attention from the political to
the agrarian struggle. Hogan was convinced that tackling the
problem by civil action alone would be useless, and that what
was needed was the widespread application to agrarian
disturbances of the decisive tactics of the Special Infantry
Columns. What would make the work of the columns easier was
the fact that many of the claims were based on transparently
selfish motives with little or no justification, and that
many claimants were not genuinely landless men, but were
9farmers or shopkeepers or otherwise well off.
When he addressed that memorandum to Cosgrave on 7 
April, Hogan was so confident that the problem could be dealt 
with swiftly and effectively, that he had already convened a 
conference between representatives of both landlords and 
tenants to see if agreement could be reached on the terms of 
the forthcoming land bill. The financial agreement had made 
a loose provision for such a conference, but it was left 
totally at the discretion of the Free State government. Yet, 
the legacy of the 1902 conference was still strong enough to 
ensure that it was taken for granted that landlords and 
tenants would be given an opportunity to reach agreement. 
However, this conference, which met on 10 April, was not a 
success, mostly due to the position taken up by the tenants. 
Led by Dennis Gorey, the leader of the Farmers' party in the 
Dail, they informed the landlords that they were now just an 
unpopular minority and that ' they could take the land from
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to settle for a reduction from rent to annuity of 50% on all
judicial rents and of 60% on non judicial rents. Not
surprisingly, these proposals were rejected by the landlords'
representatives, who looked for the terms of the 1920 bill to
be put into operation. As these allowed for reductions of
1011-33%, there was little or no chance of a compromise.
While the tenants' demands were certainly high, they
were not as extreme as those of the Unpurchased Tenants
Association, with whom the Farmers' party was in bitter
opposition. Both organisations were in open competition for
the support of the same section of society, and The Land
directed its criticisms more frequently and vehemently
against the Farmers' party than against either the landlords
or the government. In the attempt to outbid Gorey, the
convention of the Unpurchased Tenants Association, held in
the Mansion House on 17 May, demanded that tenants should
receive, retrospectively, benefits that were equivalent to
those that had been received by tenants who had purchased
under the 1903 act. Ignoring the fact that some tenants who
had signed purchase agreement under the terms of that act,
had, in 1923, still not begun paying annuities, the Mansion
House convention calculated that unpurchased tenants were
entitled to immediate reductions in rent that varied from 50%
for holders of third term rents to 75% for non judicial rent
holders. It was little wonder that they were not in a hurry
11to have land purchase completed.
The conference called by Hogan had had a second purpose,
t h e m  f o r  n o t h i n g  i f  t h e y  w i s h e d . ' I n s t e a d ,  t h e y  w e r e  w i l l i n g
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which was to come to some agreement on how to deal with the
problem of arrears of rent. While most landlords would have
been well used to having a limited amount of arrears on their
books, the problem had grown out of all proportions since
1920. Taking advantage of the general collapse of the
bailiff system, amidst the anarchy to which the country was
exposed in those years, large numbers of tenants had simply
stopped paying any rent, so that, by 1923, Hogan estimated
that no more than 15% of the estates of the country had their
rents fully paid. When one of the landlords at the
conference suggested that arrears of rent should be treated
like any other debt, such as a debt to a butcher, he was
bluntly told by the tenants 'that butchers were not getting
12their accounts paid either.1
This silent form of agitation was extremely serious for
many landlords, whose estates were often heavily mortgaged,
but it was also a source of great concern to the government.
While many tenants may have stopped paying rents as a signal
of their determination to become the owners of their
holdings, the habit of non-payment was an addictive one. As
Hogan realised, if tenants were not paying rents, nor had any
intention of doing so in the future, then they were hardly
13likely to willingly pay purchase annuities. As such, it
was imperative that any land bill contain definite provisions 
for dealing with this problem, but again, the conference 
failed to produce an agreement. The tenants proposed that 
one year's rent, less 50%, should be paid in cash, one year's 
wiped out completely, and the rest added on to the purchase
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landlords and the conference broke up, having achieved
14nothing of any substance. Once again, though, Gorey was
outdone by the Unpurchased Tenants Association, which, 
characteristically, came up with an expedient for settling 
the arrears question, that was admirable in its simplicity.
It was decided that all arrears should be wiped 
out as the tenants could not be expected to pa^rents 
for the period of the Anglo-Irish and Civil War.
The failure of the conference meant that the
responsibility for drawing up the terms of the land bill was 
left entirely with Hogan and the government. At least they 
could take solace from the fact that they were not to be left 
in a position similar to that of the British government in 
1902 ; when the land conference produced a set of proposals 
that were mutually beneficial for landlords and tenants, but 
which proved to be extremely expensive for the government. 
Though he had avoided any obligations of this kind, Hogan did 
not have a free hand in drawing up the terms of the bill. He
was aware that an alliance between the Farmers and Labour,
combined with enough desertions from the government's
supporters, would be sufficient to defeat any bill which they 
considered to be unsatisfactory; though he also gambled that 
the Farmers would want such an alliance only as a last resort 
and would, if the bill was any way reasonable, stop short of 
defeating the government on crucial votes. There were also 
wider political considerations, as, sooner or later, the 
government would have to go before the people in a general 
election.16
p r i c e  a n d  b e  p a i d  b y  a n n u i t y .  T h i s  w a s  u n a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e
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Balancing these considerations was the need, or at the
very least, the desirability, of British approval of the
legislation. Hogan had no doubt that the British would
guarantee the stock to be issued, as he believed that the
landlords would accept the terms offered to them; if only out
of fear of what might happen if the Farmers or Labour got the
17opportunity to legislate on the matter. Even so, the bill
would have to make its way through the Seanad which had a
considerable number of landlords and ex-landlords on its
benches. The government, could, theoretically have
disregarded the wishes of the Seanad, but this wasn't a
realistic option, as the bill would then have had to wait an
additional nine months before becoming law. Given the
importance of land legislation, such a situation would have
been unthinkable and could conceivably have destroyed the
young constitution of the Free State. Coercion of the second
chamber in such an instance, or the expropriation of the
landlords, would also have irredeemably tarnished the image
of the Free State as a secure place for investment in the
eyes of international financiers; as Hogan would repeatedly
emphasise to the Dail. In fact, there is just a hint that
the Minister did 'protest too much', with a suspicion that he
returned to this argument so often, not because it provided
the strongest case for treating the landlords fairly, but
18because it was easiest to defend politically.
What is beyond question is Hogan's, and the 
government's, sense of fairness. This determination to 
impartially administer justice would, even in the absence of
118
the other, material, considerations, have counteracted, to
some degree, the demands made by the Farmers and by Labour.
This is not an indictment of those parties, who were
attempting to secure the best possible terms for their
constituents, but it was accepted, even by Gorey, that the
government, precisely because it was the government, had
wider responsibilities. On only one occasion did Hogan put
forward a proposal, relating to the collection of arrears,
that could have been interpreted as being intrinsically
unjust towards the landlords, and this suggestion was rapidly
dropped. When he told the land purchase conference of April
1923 that the government took the view that ' fair play and
justice all round did not change with majorities', there is
absolutely no reason to doubt his sincerity, especially since
the same sentiments were expressed in the private
19correspondence that passed between himself and Cosgrave.
Of course, Hogan had been considering the question of 
the financial provisions of the land bill long before he 
convened the land purchase conference. In November 1922, at 
the meeting with the British committee on Irish affairs at 
which the Irish delegation, which included Hogan, first 
sought British credit for a new scheme of land purchase, the 
outlines of such a scheme were briefly discussed.
The Convention plan was agreed to as affording a 
general basis on which to proceed, but the Provisional 
Government cou^ hold out no prospect of being able to 
grant a bonus.
In December, Hogan had explained to Cosgrave in detail, 
the financial terms of the 1920 land bill which had been 
based on the proposals of the Irish convention. The
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criterion which he suggested should be used in determining
the purchase price of a holding, was that it should yield the
vendor 90% of his rent, equally well secured; 10% having
generally been lost in the costs of collection. By these
standards, he argued that the landlords would be getting too
much from the 1920 bill, as income from rent was nowhere near
as secure as income from government bonds. The removal of
the bonus would, he reckoned, leave the landlord with, at
worst, 7 0% of his old nominal income, but it would be of a
21much more reliable kind.
The matter was complicated by the arrears question,
which had to be settled, either before or simultaneously
with, the introduction of a land bill. Hogan speculated that
the landlord could be compensated for a withdrawal of the
bonus, by a promise to have all arrears paid by the tenants
before they could begin the process of purchasing their
holdings. This was a cynical, if pragmatic, reading of the
situation and it would have been very difficult to defend
publicly. In essence, it would have involved the government
using the lawlessness of the previous few years as a
deliberate bargaining ploy in negotiations with an innocent
party. Whether or not this was how the government viewed the
22proposal, the suggestion was not repeated.
When the land purchase conference met, Hogan could not 
be seen to preudge the discussion on the purchase price of 
holdings, but he did inform both sides that the government 
would not be providing any bonuses to the landlords. The 
response of the landlords was that this departure from
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previous measures should not be totally at their expense. 
That, in fact, was Hogan's intention, though he did not 
reveal that, then. Landlords with first or second term rents 
would have received, under the terms of the 192 0 bill, an 
annual income worth, on average, 82% of their rent, whereas 
the scheme that Hogan favoured would have left them with just 
66% of their previous nominal income, though he did not 
conclusively rule out even greater reductions. This was to 
be achieved by lowering the tenants annuity from an average 
of 75% of his previous rent to 70%, by using 4.5% stock 
instead of 5%, and by doing away with the bonus. Hogan 
realised that the loss of the bonus, which had traditionally 
been paid in cash and had been free of all mortgages on the 
estate, would have a severe impact on many landlords. Many 
of the estates that remained unpurchased were small and 
heavily encumbered, and he admitted that the terms he was 
proposing would leave some of them completely insolvent. 
What he suggested, in recompense, was an order that all 
mortgages should be redeemable in stock, at face value, and 
that the government should pay the vendor's costs. Both, if 
carried, would represent slight, but nevertheless
significant, improvements in the position of the landlord as
2 3against previous measures.
These details had been outlined in a memorandum that 
Hogan had sent to Cosgrave on 17 April. Less than a month 
later, on 12 May, Hogan was preparing to meet the Duke of 
Devonshire, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to inform 
him of the terms of the land bill, which eventually came
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before the Dail for a first reading on 28 May. There, Hogan
announced that the tenant with a first or second term rent
would receive a reduction from rent to annuity of 35%, rather
than of 30% as he had been considering a month earlier.
Third term holders were to be given reductions of 3 0%, and
holders of non judicial rents were to have their annuities
determined by the Land Commission. Thus, the complicated,
and not entirely effective, recommendations of the convention
on third term rents were abandoned, and if any tenant was
left worse off than if he had not had his rent revised, then
he would have to suffer the loss. This was unlikely to
happen very often, as, under the 1923 bill, third term
tenants were getting roughly 85% of the percentage reduction
given to other judicial tenants, in contrast to the 66.6%
proposed by the convention. These changes would have the
effect of greatly simplifying the operations of the bill, as
would the abandonment of the schedule of county reductions in
2 4favour of flat country-wide levels.
As TDs did not have copies of the bill in their hands 
during the first reading, these proposals were not contested, 
but, when the second reading began on 15 June, the Farmers' 
party launched into the attack. Of course, nothing could be 
done on the second reading, but at the committee stage an
amendment was tabled which would have had the effect of
bringing the reductions from rent to annuity to 40%, for all
holders of judicial rents. The Farmers, supported by Labour, 
based their claim on two arguments; the first of which was 
that agriculture was in a serious depression. While prices
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had fallen in the previous year, this was only after the boom
years of the first world war and immediately-afterwards. The
second argument was that unpurchased tenants should be placed
in as good a position as those who had purchased under the
1903 act. Hogan contended that the reduction of the annuity,
from an average of 75% of rent down to 65%, did just that,
but this did not satisfy the Farmers' party, which also
wanted compensation for the years of paying rents instead of
annuities. This argument, which had been anticipated by
25Hogan, was flatly rejected and the amendment was lost.
I presume what we have got to do now is to 
compensate all the tenants, four hundred thousand, who 
purchased under the 1903 Act for the rent they paid 
between 1885, when they should have purchased under the 
Ashbourne2^ct, and 1907, 1908, and 1909, when they did
purchase.
The Unpurchased Tenants Association, which was unhappy
with this 'landlords' measure', adopted a policy which was
similar to that of the Farmers' party in this regard. At a
convention held on 11 June, before the second reading began,
it called for the annuity to be set at 50% of rent. This was
10% more than Gorey would propose shortly afterwards in the
Dail, but it was a lot less than it had itself demanded less
2 7than a month previously. There was probably a good deal of 
truth in Hogan's suggestion that whatever reduction was given 
in the bill, the Farmers would try to have it improved. 
Under strong pressure from Hogan to justify why the reduction 
should be set at 4 0%, rather than at any other level, Gorey 
eventually conceded that that percentage was proposed only
because they thought they would have 'a chance of that figure
2 8being accepted by the government.1
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The purchaser's annuity was to be capitalised at 4.75%, 
with 0.25% of that being set aside for sinking fund payments. 
The government would obviously borrow money at the lowest 
rate available to it and the fact that it could now borrow at 
4.5%, rather than at 5% as proposed in 1918 and 1920, was an 
indication of how prices had fallen in the intervening 
period, though, of course, the interest rates were still much 
higher than they had been in 1903. The use of 4.5% instead 
of 5% stock meant that, for the same annuity, with a 0.2 5% 
sinking fund payment in each case, the landlord would get 
13.68 years' purchase instead of 12.38 years'. However, when 
these amounts were converted into annual income, the 
difference would disappear, and any gain to the landlord in 
capital would be lost in the difference in the price of the 
bonds.
Once the annuity had been fixed, the only difference the 
rate of interest made to the tenant was in the period of 
repayment. The change of stock meant that the purchaser 
would be paying annuities for 68 years rather than for 62, 
which was hardly the greatest source of worry for a new 
purchaser. Yet, the change in stock did cause some 
confusion. Richard Wilson, a member of the Farmers' party, 
tried to demonstrate that the purchaser was really paying the 
landlord 2 0 years' purchase. An annuity set at 65% of rent 
and capitalised at 3.25%, as it would have been under the 
1903 act, would give 2 0 years' purchase, so that Wilson 
concluded that what the new bill demanded was ‘tantamount to 
20 years' purchase to the tenants of the country, who do not
124
understand high finance.' Neither it seemed did their
representatives, and this hopelessly inept argument was
dismissed by the following speaker, who pithily observed that
all Wilson's calculations had succeeded in proving was that
interest rates had risen since 1903; something that could
29hardly have been blamed on Hogan.
A purchase annuity set at 65% of rent, and capitalised 
at 4.75%, left the landlord with 13.68 years' purchase and an 
annual income of just £61-12s per £100 of rent. Such 
reductions were hardly likely to be acceptable to landlords, 
or to the British government, so the state intervened. The 
government was to provide a contribution of 10% of the price, 
which would bring the landlord's total income to 15.05 years' 
purchase, or £67-15s per £100 of rent. Hogan was adamant 
that this was not a bonus, but a contribution ‘in relief of
the tenant', and the bill explicitly repealed the section of
3 0the 1903 act that provided the bonus. More importantly,
the contribution was to be paid in stock, rather than in 
cash, and it was not to be free of mortgages or superior 
interests, unlike in previous acts. By themselves, these 
facts were not enough, and Hogan displayed great ingenuity in 
arguing his point that this was not a bonus. The government, 
he explained, had decided that the landlord was entitled to 
receive 15 years' purchase for his land and that, therefore, 
the equivalent of 15 years' purchase would be the purchase 
price. It had also decided that the purchaser could not be 
expected to pay any more than 65% of his rent. This annuity, 
capitalised at 4.75%, was to be the standard price. The
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difference between the purchase price and the standard price,
which worked out at 10% of the lower figure, was to be
31provided by the government.
Despite this intricate argument and the government's 
protestations that a bonus would be indefensible, most TDs 
continued to refer to the contribution as a bonus. After one 
exchange between Hogan and Gorey, the latter, with mock
gratitude, thanked the minister for "this bonus to the tenant
32which was previously known by another name.1 He was closer 
to the truth than he realised. The Irish convention had used 
the bonus to transform terms that were barely adequate for
the landlord into something that could be said to have been
3 3slightly generous. In the context of land purchase
legislation, the bonus had taken on a meaning that was
distinct from that in common usage, becoming an integral part
of the price structure. Had the government not included the
contribution, which it was estimated would cost around
£50,000 per annum, in the bill, it is likely that the
tenants' annuity would have been greater and the landlord's
income less. The Labour party were not amenable to
persuasion on the matter, however, and their determination to
see that the landlords did not benefit from the public purse
led Thomas Johnson into espousing what looks suspiciously
like a free market doctrine.
Whatever is a fair price to charge t|^ tenants 
that is the fair price to pay the landlords.
This amendment was defeated, as were a number of attacks
on the provision to establish a costs fund. This fund was to
consist of stock, up to the value of 2% of the total amount
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advanced under the act, and was to be distributed, at the
discretion of the Judicial Commissioner, to landlords in
compensation for the cost of establishing a clear title to 
35the land. This process could involve much legal work and
was often slow and expensive, especially for those whose 
estates were heavily encumbered. Wilson, along with
The Land. attacked this section as providing an extra 2%
3 6'bonus' to the landlord, but this was incorrect. There was 
actually no limit as to the amount the Judicial Commissioner 
could award an individual landlord, except insofar as the 
average amount awarded had to remain below the 2% limit.
Equally beneficial to the landlord was the government's 
adoption of the Irish convention's proposal that state
duties, such as death duties, should be made redeemable by
the transfer of land stock, at face value. However, the
government went further than this and declared all superior 
interests on land to be similarly redeemable; something which 
the convention had baulked at doing. In like vein was a 
clause which was suggested by Gerald Fitzgibbon, the 
strongest defender of the landlords in the Dail and later a 
judge of the Supreme Court, and readily adopted by Hogan. 
This section was aimed at preventing a mortgagee from 
charging a landlord penal interest rates on default of normal
payment, where the non-payment was due to the delays involved
37 . . .in the completion of sale of the estate. This provision,
together with those concerning the costs fund and the
redemption of superior interests, would not have impacted
greatly on many landlords, but would have been of immense
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benefit to those most in need of assistance. For such 
landlords, these sections marked major improvements on 
previous legislation, and they were firm proof of the 
government's stated intention to treat the landlords with 
complete fairness.
Hogan had again to assume the mantle of defender of the
landlords' interests when the questions of rent and arrears
of rent were discussed. The bill provided that rent payments
from the passing of the act to the appointed day were to be
replaced by a 'payment in lieu of rent', worth 75% of the
rent and collectible by the Land Commission, who would then
pay over the amounts, less deductions for costs, to the
landlords. Arrears of rent for the previous three years,
also reduced by 25%, were similarly to be collected by the
Land Commission, while any arrears due for the period before
1920 were to be cancelled, although, as Hogan knew, the
amounts thus cleared were relatively insignificant. One
year's portion of what was called 'compounded arrears of
rent1 was to be paid in cash immediately after the passing of
the act and the remainder, if any, added on to the purchase 
3 8money. Of course, the Farmers' party, supported by Labour,
was not satisfied, and in vain sought to have the liability
for arrears reduced from three years to two, and the
reduction increased from 25% to 40%. With some
justification, Hogan accused both parties of playing for
popularity while knowing that they would not have to face the
39responsibility of implementing their policies.
What aroused the most bitter attacks on landlords, and
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landlordism, were the attempts by some landlords to have 
their rents collected through the machinery of the law before 
the bill could be passed. After the chaos of the preceding 
years, the landlords had begun to be more assertive in the 
collection of rents and their position was strengthened by 
the Enforcement of Law Act, 1923, which the Farmers' party 
had supported; a fact which was mercilessly used against them 
by Labour. Whilst these proceedings caused much unease 
amongst the Farmers' TDs, the fact that decrees continued to 
be enforced, and fresh proceedings begun, after the terms of 
the land bill became known, drew a storm of protest from 
them, as they charged that landlords were deliberately 
attempting to evade the provisions of the bill.
In this, Hogan concurred, though the solution he
offered, which was probably the fairest compromise available
40to him, once again fell short of the Farmers' demands. A
clause was inserted which stipulated that arrears of rent
collected by decree between 28 May, when the bill was first
read, and 3 July, the date of the amendment, were to be
regarded as payments in respect of compounded arrears, as
outlined in the bill, and that in any instance where the
tenant paid more in arrears, so collected, than he would have
had to pay under the bill, then he would be credited with the
balance and his payment in lieu of rent appropriately
reduced. Any arrears collected by decree after 3 July would
be similarly treated, except that, in such cases, the
landlord would also forfeit his claim to legal expenses,
41which were often quite substantial. While the Farmers'
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party continued to complain about the arrears section, Hogan
had the last word on the matter when, on the bill's fifth
stage in the Dail, he could claim that half the arrears due
throughout the country had been paid according to the terms
42of the bill, even before it became law.
Without a doubt, the most important section of the bill 
was section 24, which outlined the scope of the new 
legislation. All tenanted land, with certain limited 
exceptions, was to automatically vest in the Land Commission, 
as was all untenanted land in the congested districts, where 
it would be used for the purpose of 'relieving congestion1.
All tenanted land wherever situated and all 
untenanted land situated in any congested districts 
county and such untenanted land situated elsewhere as 
the Land Commission shall, before the appointed day, 
declare to be required for the purpose of relieving 
congestion or of facilitating the resale of tenanted 
land, shall by virtue of this 4^ct vest in the Land 
Commission on the appointed day.
The following sub-section listed the exceptions to these 
provisions. These exceptions were similar to the categories 
that had been exempted in previous measures and included: 
land purchased under previous land purchase acts or under the 
Irish Church Act, 1869, non-agricultural land, church lands, 
demesnes, home farms, land with value as a building ground, 
or any land held by a public authority or corporation for use 
in regard to railways, public water supply or electricity. 
However, all these exceptions, other than public authority or 
corporation lands, could be disregarded by the Land 
Commission if it declared any holding to be required for the 
purpose of relieving congestion. In effect, the Land 
Commission was to be given the necessary power to acquire
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almost any land it wished for the purposes of relieving 
44congestion.
This section is the one that has most attracted the
attention of historians and, in fact, it is the only section
that is known to many. Yet, a reader of the Dail debates for
the period of the bill's passage through the Dail could be
forgiven if they failed to realise this. Only William
Magennis referred to the ‘revolutionary1 nature of the bill
as being one of confiscation; a confiscation of which he
4 5thoroughly approved. This did not reflect any lack of
interest on the part of TDs, but, rather, it underlined the
extent to which the principle of compulsion was taken for
granted. A land bill in 192 3 without compulsion would have
been unthinkable, and when TDs welcomed the bill on its first
and second readings, whilst criticising its details, they
were, in effect, welcoming this section. The battle that had
been lost in 1902 was now to be won without a struggle;
compulsion having been conceded by the Irish convention and
by the 1920 land bill. In fact, Wilson, with his usual
mastery of logical reasoning, attempted to argue that because
a few landlords' representatives had previously agreed on the
principle, the 1923 bill was merely implementing an agreement
and the question of acquiring land by compulsion did not
46arise. Nobody bothered to contradict him.
Tenanted land which had become vested in the Land 
Commission under section 24, was, in the normal course of 
events, to be subsequently vested in the occupying tenant on 
the appointed day, when the payment of purchase annuities
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would begin. However, the Land Commission was to be given
extensive powers to retain, if it so desired, any holding
with a purchase price of over £3,000, or any holding "which
in the opinion of the Land Commission ought to be retained
for improvement or enlargement, or for utilisation in
connection with the relief of congestion.1 Enlargement was
to be made possible by the addition of land that had
previously been untenanted, or of land that had formed part
of another tenanted holding which had been retained by the
Land Commission. Tenants of holdings which had been divided
in this manner were generally to be offered new holdings in
exchange, though the new holdings could, theoretically, be
located anywhere in the country. A new holding was not
guaranteed though, as the powers of the Land Commission to
resume a holding, on payment of compensation to the tenant
47were specifically safeguarded.
Apart from the matters of price or of arrears, the most 
contentious section in the bill, as it passed through the
Dail, was the one that dealt with the categories of people to
whom the Land Commission could issue advances for the 
purchase of land; other than advances to tenants to purchase 
their holdings. These categories were: congests, tenants
exchanging holdings with the Land Commission, people who had 
been evicted since 1878, labourers on estates that were being 
divided, and "any other person or body to whom in the opinion 
of the Land Commission an advance ought to be made. 1 This
last clause was intended, primarily, to cover landless men
who did not qualify under the clauses concerning evicted
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tenants or labourers, but Hogan made it quite clear, both
before and during the passage of the bill, that congests were
to have the first claim on untenanted land and that only when
their cases were dealt with was the remainder of the
untenanted land to be distributed amongst the other groups
mentioned in the section. The consequence of this policy was
that many of the landless men who had been at the forefront
of agrarian agitation since 1918 would have little prospect
of acquiring a holding under the terms of the bill. That was
one of the principal reasons why it had been necessary to
wait until public order had been fully restored and
untenanted land cleared of unauthorised holdings', before
48introducing the bill.
It was not the fate of these men that most engaged the 
sympathy of TDs, but, rather, it was the plight of evicted 
tenants. Many TDs were unhappy with their relegation behind 
congests in the order of priority of treatment, but they were 
even more unhappy with the time limitation imposed, though 
the absurdity of having an open-ended clause dealing with 
evicted tenants had been exposed by Kevin O'Higgins on the 
second reading.
Shortly after the Provisional Government was 
established I got a letter from a gentleman, one Simon 
P. O'Rorke, an estate agent, who wrote from 154th 
Street, New York. He was quite candid as to his 
requirements. He said that he understood there would 
be a certain pressure of business for some time upon 
us, but that he would ask me to write to him to say 
when it would be convenient for us to entertain his 
claim to Leitrim, Cavan, and certain areas around 
there, as he was quite sure tj^t he was a lineal 
descendant of O'Rorke of Breffni.
This was a question that was laced with emotion and
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Hogan had to face a series of amendments which would have 
extended the right of evicted tenants, or their descendants, 
to lodge a claim under the section, if the eviction had taken 
place since 1860, since 1833 or at any time in the past. 
There was also an amendment which proposed compensating 
evicted tenants in cash. Doing his best to inject some 
realism into the debate, Hogan pointed out that the effect of 
such an amendment would be to leave the government liable to 
claims for compensation from Irish emigrants all over the 
world. Eventually, he accepted the insertion of a proviso 
which allowed the Land Commission to consider the claims of 
evicted tenants from before 1878, but this meant very little 
as the proviso was tagged on to the clause dealing with 
landless men, and so would have been at the end of the Land 
Commission's list of priorities. Nevertheless, the inclusion 
of this clause allowed all sides to salvage some honour from 
the debate.50
The debate in the Seanad was of a different character 
from the one that had taken place in the Dail, with the 
almost complete absence of organised parties allowing 
individual Senators complete freedom to speak their minds on 
any issue and to vote with, or against, the government as 
they saw fit. Despite this freedom, the Seanad never, save 
on one occasion, went anywhere close to defying the wishes of 
the government in any division on the bill. The fifth stage 
of the bill was carried by an overwhelming 29 votes to 2; the 
dissenters being the most implacable opponents of the bill 
throughout its passage, Sir John Keane and John Counihan, a
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member of the executive of the Irish Cattle Traders 
Association, while a third Senator, John Bagwell, would also 
have voted against the bill had he been present. Keane, in 
particular, opposed the basic principle of the bill and he 
fought Hogan doggedly on almost every issue. That he should 
have found himself in such an isolated position was a stark 
indication of how the political climate had changed since 
compulsory purchase had been ruled out in 1903.
The passage of the bill through the Seanad provided
ample proof of the commitment of those ex-unionists present
to serve in the best interests of the country, but it was
also, as a number of Senators pointed out, a tribute to the
skill and expertise of Hogan in guiding the bill. Anything
less than a complete mastery of his brief would have been
quickly exposed in the Seanad, where the collective
legislative experience of land measures was much more
impressive than in the Dail. This was highlighted by the
presence of three members of the 1902 land conference;
Colonel Sir William Hutcheson Poe, Sir Nugent Everard and the
Earl of Mayo. The latter pair, in particular, proved, as
Everard predicted, to be amongst the strongest supporters of
the bill. The Earl of Dunraven, who had chaired the
conference, was also a Senator, but was an infrequent
52attender and took no part in the debate on the bill.
The greatest difficulty felt by most Senators, with 
regard to the bill, was the wide-ranging nature of the powers 
that were to be given to the Land Commission, especially in 
section 24. They did not, as some might have expected,
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object to the compulsory purchase of tenanted land, and this
provision passed as quietly as it had in the Dail. The
automatic take-over, with certain exceptions, of all
untenanted land which lay in the congested districts was much
more contentious and was subjected to a number of amendments.
One of these, which proposed removing the automatic, though
not the compulsory, nature of the process, was only defeated
by three votes, despite Hogan's assurance that the interests
53of the landowners would be taken into account. Also
strenuously opposed was the power that was to be given to the
Land Commission to enable them to take any land for the
relief of congestion. This, of course, affected demesne
lands, but what worried Senators even more was the fact that
land purchased under any previous land act would no longer be
54exempt from compulsory acquisition by the Land Commission.
These clauses were defended resolutely by Hogan who 
argued that without them, the Land Commission would have no 
hope of tackling the problem of congestion and that one of 
the principal aims of the bill would have to be sacrificed. 
However, he was prepared to compromise, and in order to 
assuage, to some extent, the fears of some Senators, he 
agreed to insert a number of clauses which would prevent the 
Land Commission from abusing its powers. Two of these 
amendments were particularly significant. The Land
Commission was not to exercise its power to acquire, for the 
relief of congestion, land otherwise exempted, if suitable 
land, that was not similarly exempted, was available in the 
locality. If the Land Commission acquired, under the same
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clause, land that had been purchased under previous acts,
then they were obliged to offer the owner another holding of
a similar value. This amendment followed a warning from
Andrew Jameson, a prominent banker, that, as the bill stood,
land would be completely devalued as a banking security.
Though Hogan had argued that the effects of these amendments
were already in the bill, there is no guarantee that a court
of law would have agreed, and when he introduced these
amendments to the Dail, he generously admitted that they
55constituted 'a real improvement m  the bill.1
While a number of Senators disagreed with the Earl of 
Mayo's assessment of the prices offered to landlords for 
tenanted land, as being at a level that "English landowners
would jump at', there was no serious debate, nor any
56amendments proposed, on the matter. Much more contentious 
was the proposed method for fixing the price of untenanted 
land. The bill declared that the price was to be fixed by 
the Land Commission, or, on appeal, by the Judicial 
Commissioner, and that in fixing the price, account should be 
taken of "the fair value of land to the Land Commission and 
the owner respectively. ' This was unacceptable to some 
Senators who attempted, unsuccessfully, to ensure that the 
landowner, who could have been a grazier or a large farmer 
rather than a landlord in the traditional mould, would 
receive the full market value for his land that was, after 
all, being acquired by compulsion.
One of the weak links in this argument, as Keane 
realised, was that the criterion of fairness to both owner
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and Land Commission had been included in the 1920 bill. When
the report of the land purchase sub-committee of the Irish
convention was being discussed in January 1918, Lord
McDonnell had singled out this clause as being of great
importance. Keane tried to counter these arguments by
claiming that the 1920 bill was not an agreed measure, and in
any case, was irrelevant to the bill before them. This
merely reflected his frustration at Hogan's constant use of
the 1920 bill to justify various clauses in the present
measure and the pressure he successfully brought to bear on
57Senators, not to change an agreement already made.
By the time the bill left both houses of the Oireachtas, 
it contained eighty sections as well as two schedules and was 
a comprehensive attempt to deal with the land problem. A 
Purchase Annuities Fund was set up, with a minimum of fuss, 
into which annuities due from the land purchase acts prior to 
1923 would be paid, and from which these annuities would then 
be paid "to the appropriate authority . for the credit of the 
Land Purchase Account or the Irish Land Purchase Fund'.
Wide-ranging powers were to be given to the Land Commission 
to provide for the compulsory acquisition of turbary, the
allocation of responsibility for the maintenance of
embankments and watercourses, and the preservation of
monuments and antiquities on agricultural land.
Sporting rights of little value on tenanted land were to 
be vested in the purchaser, but sporting rights on untenanted 
land acquired under the bill, as well as all fishing rights 
attached to acquired land, were to vest in the Land
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Commission, who could then rent them out. Under the 19 03 
act, the ownership of sporting and fishing rights on each 
estate had been decided by the individual purchase agreement, 
with the Land Commission acquiring these rights only in the 
absence of agreement between vendor and purchaser on the 
matter. All mineral rights, excluding stone or sand, or 
mines already in operation, on land that would pass under the 
operations of the bill, were to be vested in the government, 
with provision being made that the owner of land on which 
minerals were successfully extracted, would be awarded a 
suitable share of the proceeds. This was an extension of the 
principle that had been adopted by the 1903 act, but which 
had then excluded from this provision, demesne lands resold 
to their owners. The appointed day was to vary from estate 
to estate and Hogan successfully resisted pressure from both 
chambers to fix a definite date.
When the bill had passed all stages in both houses, the 
government moved that it was 'necessary for the immediate 
preservation of the public peace1. Article 47 of the 
constitution provided that there was to be an automatic stay 
of one week before any measures, except money bills, that had 
been passed by the Oireachtas would become law. If, during 
this period, a simple majority of Senators, or 40% of TDs, so 
demanded, then the legislation was to be suspended for ninety 
days, and if, during this ninety day period, a motion was 
passed with the support of 60% of Senators, or a petition 
signed by 5% of the voters on the registrar, then the bill in 
question would be submitted to a referendum. However, these
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provisions could be circumvented if both houses agreed that
the bill was "necessary for the immediate preservation of the
public peace, health or safety.'58 Initially, Darrell
Figgis, who had been one of the prime movers in the drafting
of the constitution, objected to the application of this
emergency proviso to the land bill, as he considered it an
unnecessary abuse of the constitution. However, he received
no support, and Cosgrave, Wilson and Johnson all pointed out
that were the bill to be delayed by one week, let alone by
ninety days, there would be a large number of writs enforced
for the collection of arrears and there was a real danger of
serious unrest in many parts of the country. There were no
objections to the resolution in the Seanad, although John
O'Farrell warned that such acquiescence could not be taken
59for granted in other, less urgent cases.
On 9 August 1923, a bill entitled, "An Act to amend the 
law relating to the occupation and ownership of land and for 
other purposes relating thereto1, with a short title, "The 
Land Act, 1923', became law in the area of the Free State, 
and the agricultural landlord passed into history.60
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CONCLUSION
In the popular mind, the history of Ireland is often
seen as being a simple and straightforward story. It
concerns the good guys versus the bad guys, the Irish versus 
the English, and the Catholics versus the Protestants; though 
the various adjectives used in describing the latter 
categories are easily interchangeable, depending on which
side of the fence one was positioned. It is also a great
romantic story, with repeated failures being climaxed at last 
by 'success' and independence.
Such a story has, of course, an exceedingly strong cast 
of villains, with none playing their part better than the 
notorious landlords. This nefarious group first made their 
appearance in popular demonology at the time of the famine, 
when they heartlessly evicted the starving tenants because 
they could not pay their rents. The occasional kind landlord 
that met bankruptcy helping his tenants was merely the 
proverbial exception that proved the rule. This cruel 
ensemble continued with their foul deeds, casting entire 
families onto the side of the road on a whim, until they met 
their match in the heroes of the Land League, led by the 
noble, but flawed, Parnell, and the one-armed Davitt. The 
Land War' that followed was one of the great setpiece 
confrontations in Irish history, though it is not generally 
known as to who actually won this war. What eventually
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happened to the landlords is also somewhat obscure, but what 
is important is that they disappeared from view; so ending a 
distracting side-plot and leaving the twentieth century stage 
free for the climactic political struggle.
There is no doubt but that this simplified variety of
Irish history has been of immense benefit to those with
vested interests in perpetuating sterile beliefs and old
stereotypes, but it has also given a great many people the
reassurance that they were on the right side'. That
practically all cultures and groups on the island can claim
to have been 'on the right side', is an achievement that is
perhaps peculiar to Ireland. Irish 'history' has inspired
countless ballads, poems and apocryphal stories, some of
great literary merit. Even the most hardened, or
disillusioned, of sceptics could hardly fail to be moved by
de Valera's wonderful oratory during his reply to Churchill
after the war. In what was probably the most memorable
expression of the nationalist brand of history, he spoke of
the small nation that stood alone', 'that could never be got
to accept defeat1, and, most poignantly of all, that 'never
1surrendered her soul1.
It is the outstanding achievement of twentieth century 
Irish historiography that, in a work such as this, one no 
longer feels it necessary to illustrate in detail how such a 
marvellous tale could not withstand the most cursory of 
examinations. In the light of all that has been written, 
anyone still writing an unreconstructed nationalist history 
of Ireland, could do so only if they had one eye open to the
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imagination and the other eye closed to the truth. The 
pursuit of beliefs and self-vindication through history, have 
led to awkward evidence being jettisoned and uncomfortable 
facts being ignored. The truth is that all history, 
including Irish history, is never anything but complicated.
Unfortunately, even twentieth century Irish
historiography is sometimes not complicated enough. The
danger of over-simplification is always present, and in few
fields of study, has this danger been more harshly realised
than in the history of land purchase. As the introduction to
this work has shown, land purchase has generally been
regarded as a nineteenth century phenomenon. This is
especially true if the nineteenth century is given an
extension to 1903, when the Wyndham act comes slightly behind
its time; although some brave souls have ventured to delay
the end of the era until 1909. Even when writers, like
Philip Bull, deal with the 1903 act, they are not so much
concerned with its actual success, not to mention its
failures, as a land purchase measure, as they are with the
forlorn hopes that were briefly raised of a conciliation
2between the two political elites on the island. To make 
land purchase fit into this neat scheme of interpretation, 
the completion of land purchase has been regarded as an 
inevitability, from even before the 1903 act, and the 1923 
act, if it is mentioned at all, is regarded merely as a 
tidying up exercise. It would simply be too inconvenient to 
admit that there was a genuine land question in twentieth 
century Ireland.
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What makes this consensus interpretation all the more
difficult to understand is that it runs counter to the
contemporary evidence, especially of those who were in the
appropriate positions to know. There were between 50,000 and
70,000 unpurchased tenants in Ireland in 1916, depending on
whose figures are believed, and Sir Henry Doran of the CDB
warned that the patience of these men would not last 
3indefinitely. This warning was taken with the utmost
seriousness by the members of the Irish convention, who 
believed that the solution of the land problem was a 
necessary prerequisite for political stability. The evidence 
of this belief lies in the fact that some of the ablest and 
most experienced of the delegates were appointed to the land 
purchase sub-committee. Yet, the principal historian of the 
convention devoted so little space to this committee, that 
one is left with the unmistakable impression that he regarded 
the committee as little more than an irrelevancy and a 
distraction to the main business of the convention, which 
would seem to have been a debate over who should control 
customs and excise.4
This reflection on the committee is grossly unfair, as 
it produced an outstanding report. The committee's first 
task had been to allocate responsibility for the collection 
of annuities. It decided that the provisions of the 1914 
home rule act in this regard were unnecessary and unworkable, 
and that the Irish government should be made responsible for 
the collection of annuities and their payment to the Imperial 
exchequer. In the light of subsequent controversy, it is
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worth noting that the idea that the Irish government might 
retain the annuities for their own benefit doesn't seem to 
have been mentioned. The Imperial exchequer, to which the 
Irish government would pay its share, was to be held liable 
for the administrative costs of land purchase and the 
completion of pending sales. The latter duty would be very 
expensive, involving the creation of large amounts of excess 
stock, but the committee felt that the government was under a 
solemn obligation to carry out these sales on the terms 
agreed.5
The committee then considered the reasons why land
purchase had stopped, and concluded that the 1903 and 1909
acts were not equal to the task, despite the lavish praise
that they had received. The problem with both acts was that
the rates of stock that they used were set too low to be
commercially attractive. The result was that the 19 03 act
proved to be enormously expensive for the government, as to
raise the cash necessary to pay the vendor his purchase price
and bonus, ever growing proportions of excess 2.75% stock had
to be issued. The 1909 act stipulated that the vendors were
to be paid their purchase price in 3% stock at face value,
though the bonus remained in cash, but this merely
transferred the burden from the government to the vendor, as
such stock would be greatly depreciated if sold on the open
market. To avoid these difficulties in the future, the
committee recommended that new stock be issued at 5%, in the
hope that the interest rate would be sufficiently high to
6avoid any great depreciation of the stock.
145
It was in its proposals for the completion of land 
purchase that the committee really left its mark. Never 
before had landlords' representatives agreed in conference to 
the compulsory purchase of all tenanted land, and, by itself, 
this agreement should have merited the committee members a 
distinguished place in history. Equally significant,
however, was the proposed method by which this compulsion was 
to be carried through. The automatic method would obviate 
the long drawn out negotiations that had been customary under 
previous acts, and that, given the compulsory nature of the 
agreement, would have been intractable in many cases. To 
have asked tenants to pay the same proportions of rent that 
their neighbours with similar holdings would have paid under 
the 1903 act was not unduly unfair, as, in the meantime, 
rents had not risen, and some had even decreased, while 
agricultural prices had increased appreciably. Perhaps the 
most radical of the committee's proposals concerned the 
automatic vesting in the CDB of all untenanted land that was 
situated in the congested districts; with the vendors not 
even being guaranteed the market value of their land. Though 
some of the committee members themselves would have been 
loath to admit it, this clause marked the future of land 
policy in Ireland. As all tenants became the purchasers of
their holdings, land re-distribution was to assume huge
7importance m  rural Ireland.
Although the land purchase sub-committee of the 
convention concluded their report early in 1918, it was to be 
another five years before their work bore any tangible
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fruits. In the meantime anarchy seemed to reign, and in the 
west, a land war broke out that was as vicious and intense as 
anything that had been seen in the previous century. While 
the British had taken effective action in 1918, by 1920 they 
no longer had the power to do so, even if they had the will. 
Instead, it was the Dail that intervened, in a desperate 
attempt to prevent the agrarian struggle from taking over
completely in many areas, from the fight for independence. 
The Land Bank was a brave experiment, but it had limited 
resources and was operating at a time of very high land
prices, and the fact that those tenants it had helped to 
purchase land had to be rescued by the government in 1923 is
gitself sufficient comment on its lack of long term success.
The Land Settlement Commission of the Dail had to face 
similar problems. It had a tiny staff that operated under 
cover out of a land valuer's office, first in North Earl 
Street and later over Bewley's Tea Rooms in Westmoreland
Street. It had just two full time commissioners to cover the 
entire country, and when the Provisional government came to 
power, its staff was slowly absorbed into the more
traditional government departments. While neither the Land 
Bank nor the Land Settlement Commission had any enduring role 
to play in the new Free State, nevertheless, they had 
performed the immediate tasks asked of them with distinction. 
In the highly unusual circumstances of the time, they had the 
flexibility to respond as the occasion demanded; something 
that larger, more conventional, government institutions would 
probably have lacked. Unfortunately, both of their creators,
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Robert Barton and Art O'Connor, opposed the Treaty, as did 
Conor Maguire one of the Commissioners, and their hard-earned 
experience was lost, for the time being at least. All three 
were to reap the reward for their services when de Valera 
came to power: Barton became head of the Agricultural Credit 
Corporation: Maguire became Chief Justice: and 'the chubby,
cheerful and good-looking' O'Connor was also appointed to the 
judiciary.9
When Patrick Hogan became Minister for Agriculture in 
the Provisional government, and subsequently in the Free 
State government, his brief was dominated by the question of 
land purchase policy. Within a short time, he was
tentatively beginning the onerous task of drawing up a land 
purchase measure. In what was probably an attempt to shore 
up the value of the stock to be issued, and thereby to 
protect the landlords from its depreciation, the Provisional 
government in 1922 requested the British to provide financial 
credit for future Irish land stock. This, the British agreed 
to do, but naturally they wanted to ensure that they were 
giving their credit to a provision that was financially sound 
and they also wanted some security from the Irish 
government. 0
This was a perfectly reasonable arrangement, but in cold 
print, it looked quite different. Hogan realised the danger 
that the financial agreement could be interpreted as giving 
Britain a veto over Free State land purchase legislation. 
This would have been a political catastrophe, so Hogan, 
acting on his own initiative, told the tenants that no
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conditions had been entered into with the British. The
direct consequence of this action was that the agreement had
to be kept secret. It is ironic that when the agreement was
used by the British during the row over the annuities, and
then published by de Valera, the real reason for its secrecy
was forgotten. The fact that the agreement came to light
during the row over the annuities has tended to confuse the
issue, and to obscure the fact that it was the British
guarantee of stock and right of approval of the land bill,
coupled with Hogan's denial of the latter, that had kept the
11agreement secret for so long.
Having avoided a major political controversy so 
narrowly, there was no need to tell Hogan that land purchase 
was still an explosive political issue. Yet, the same year, 
1923, he tackled the issue head on. First, he absorbed the 
CDB and the Land Settlement Commission into the newly 
reconstituted Land Commission, before he brought the land 
bill into the house. The political stakes were very high, 
both for Hogan personally and for the government. For both 
it was a resounding success. While Hogan received great 
praise from both Dail and Seanad, none was more lavish than 
that bestowed on him by the Labour TD, Sean Lyons, shortly 
after the bill was first read.
I think the point of view the nation is taking at 
the present time is that the Minister for Agriculture 
should be looked upon as the idol of the people. In a 
very short time they will begin to realise that we have 
one man^t least in Ireland who is able to satisfy the 
people.
The reason why Hogan was suddenly so popular was that he 
had just brought in a bill that had finally abolished rural
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landlordism in Ireland, at terms that were reasonably
described by Darrell Figgis as being as fair as possible to
both sides. It did not matter to most people that the bill
was based largely on the proposals of the Irish convention,
or on the 1920 land bill which the British government had
fashioned from the same proposals. That it was based on the
convention proposals was freely acknowledged by all the
principal players, and in the Seanad, Hogan referred to the
1920 bill almost every second time he rose to speak. He used
its origins to particularly good effect when the Seanad was
debating the automatic vesting of untenanted land in the CDB
and the compensation clauses for landowners in the same
section. Many Senators realised the full significance of
these proposals, and it took all of Hogan's powers of
persuasion to prevent the government from being defeated.
The previous agreement of landlords to these measures, and
their origins in a landlord tenant committee, were the trump
cards that he played at this crucial moment, and defeat was
13narrowly avoided.
The 1923 land act was not the last piece of land 
purchase legislation to be passed by an Irish government, 
whether Free State or Republic. There were to be many more 
acts enlarging the powers of the Land Commission to acquire 
land for redistribution. There were also to be a number of 
amending acts regarding the transfer of ownership between 
landlord and tenant. These covered procedural matters and 
aimed to shorten what seemed to many the excessively long 
time that tenants had to wait before having the land vested
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in them. The real source of delay was the enormous amount 
of work suddenly presented to Land Commission officials, and 
changing the procedures made very little difference. Had an 
automatic method of price fixing not been adopted in 1923, 
then the delay would have been about three times as great. 
After 1923, there were no major changes in this method and no 
alteration of the scope of the act, as regards landlords and 
tenants. Very simply, this was because after 1923, there 
were no landlords left to buy out.
14
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